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ABSTRACT
How do relationships between leaders influence world politics? I argue that shared identity
between leaders makes cooperation more likely by increasing interpersonal trust. Leaders who
share more similar social identities are more likely to trust each other, while leaders who have
divergent social identities find it more difficult to trust. I test this theory in the three contexts
of nuclear cooperation agreements, nuclear proliferation under extended deterrence, and alliance
formation. I use data on nuclear cooperation agreements, nuclear pursuit, alliances, and leader
background characteristics in the period from 1840-2002. Statistical analysis shows that leaders
who share similar social identities are more likely to engage in nuclear cooperation, less likely
to pursue independent nuclear acquisition under extended deterrence, and more likely to form
alliances with one another, indicating that shared background experiences contribute to leaders
trusting one another. This study provides evidence that interpersonal relationships among leaders
shape international relations in three important contexts, thereby contributing to our understanding
of how leaders matter in world politics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
What is the role of trust between leaders in world politics? It is true that there are often strate-
gic incentives for states to cooperate. In other words, states often cooperate when it is in their
best interest to do so. However, states cooperate even when cooperation may not be in their best
interest, or when strategic imperatives alone would not strictly suggest cooperation. What explains
cooperation between countries on issues related to international security?
Rationalist literature would suggest that cooperation is made difficult by information and com-
mitment problems (Fearon, 1995). In other words, cooperation fails when there is insufficient
information about others (and because others have incentives to misrepresent information), and
because there are incentives to renege on promises. A solution for these problems in the ratio-
nalist framework is signaling. Signaling can provide information about the type of actor, and can
demonstrate the credibility of a commitment through hand-tying or sunk cost mechanisms (Fearon,
1997). Rationalist solutions to the issues of insufficient information and commitment problems ad-
dress the issues of how it is impossible to know the intentions of other actors and how it is hard to
count on others to keep their word, especially in an uncertain future. Within the field of political
science rationalist solutions are broadly accepted and are considered to be one of the most robust
explanations for patterns of conflict and cooperation.
I argue that turning to psychological and emotional understandings of political actors can pro-
vide further insight into the problems of low information about the interests and intentions of others
and the inability to believe the promises of other actors. By considering psychology and emotions
alongside traditional rationalist explanations it is possible to better understand cooperation in world
politics. In particular, looking at leaders, and how leaders feel about one another, relate to one an-
other, and trust or distrust one another, can allow for a better understanding of when cooperation
is likely to occur.1
1I am not first to argue that personal impressions between leaders influence international politics. Hall and Yarhi-
Milo (2012, 561) for example argue that “on issues of high politics and in the midst of crises, personal impressions
played a significant role as — and arguably even a greater role than — costly signals in shaping key decisions.” While
1
Let’s address the two barriers to cooperation separately. First, it may be difficult to cooperate
in world politics because other actors have incentives to renege on commitments and back out of
agreements. When can leaders believe that other heads of state will keep their word?
Others will keep their word or do what they say when the costs of reneging are large. Prior
scholars recognize this, leading to the discussion of sinking costs and tying hands (Fearon, 1997).
The extant rationalist literature however fails to recognize that costs may take on forms besides
material and reputational costs, and that leaders in particular may be subject to additional costs
compared to the nation-state. Leaders may also pay emotional costs, or suffer feelings of doubt,
upset, and self-hate when betraying trusted partners.
The emotional costs of reneging or lying will be high when lying, backing out of an agreement,
or betraying another actor hurts a leader’s own image of self or identity, or when a leader’s action
hurts someone with whom a leader trusts. This is likely to take place when a leader empathizes
with or understands another and sees other leaders as similar to the self. These negative emotions
are implicitly costly to a leader, and cause leaders to prefer not to injure those that they are similar
to. These costs cause leaders to prefer to keep their commitments to friends and in-group members,
and other leaders know this because they go through the same process of empathization. Simply,
it is more difficult or costly to betray a partner when there is a shared identity or connection.
The second barrier to cooperation in world politics is the inability to truly know the intentions of
another actor. In other words, there will always be insufficient information about the interests and
intentions of political actors, and actors also have incentives to misrepresent information. Given
this reality, how can leaders be confident that another leader does not want to cause harm? In
other words, how is it possible to know what other leaders think, feel, and want? I argue that
social identities provide information that helps leaders to understand the preferences, intentions,
emotions, and world views of other leaders. In particular, leaders with more similar social identities
have more points on which to try to understand one another, and are more likely to trust one
the authors do not focus on personal-level variables about leaders, they do acknowledge that individual characteristics
could contribute to the type of relationship formed between leaders. For more on the relationship between face-to-face
interactions and my theory, see Chapter 5.
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another.2
Identity ⇒ Trust⇒ Cooperation
There are many examples of how trust between political leaders may contribute to improved
relations among countries. In the 1980’s for example, the relationship between the former Argen-
tinian President Raúl Alfonsín and the former Brazilian President José Sarney contributed to rap-
prochement on nuclear issues after decades of tension. The personal relationship between Amer-
ican President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev contributed to the easing of Cold
War tensions. Secretary Gorbachev himself argued that “personal ‘compatibility’ and understand-
ing of your partners’ motives” is important in world politics and that, “many difficult issues are far
more easily and quickly resolved if there is trust between political leaders, without unnecessary
diplomatic moves and formalities”(Forsberg, 1999, 617-618).
The role of trust in world politics is important to understand both because trust can make co-
operation easier and cheaper, and because there is relatively little understanding of how leaders’
psychologies and emotions contribute to political outcomes. State leaders, the politicians and bu-
reaucrats who govern both the domestic and foreign policies of individual states, are subject to
emotions and implicit judgments about others just as other humans are. Political leaders are con-
stantly assessing the trustworthiness of political actors, both within their own county, and outside
national borders.
In Chapter 2 I discuss my theory of how shared background identities between leaders influence
international cooperation in more detail. Prior to this discussion however, it is useful to have an
understanding of what trust is and how it has been previously studied in social science literature.
1.1 Political Trust
There are generally three schools of thought on the role of trust in international politics. The
first school refrains from offering a definition of trust, holding instead that while trust may be
2For more on my theory of leadership similarity, See Chapter 2.
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possible among individuals, trust is unimportant for interactions among states. Perhaps the most
prominent statement in this regard is from John Mearsheimer (1990, 12), who argues, there is
“little room for trust among states because a state may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed.”
In other words, in a state of anarchy nations must constantly be concerned for their own survival,
and therefore are unlikely to rely on trust to dictate behavior. According to many realists then, trust
is largely irrelevant in world politics.
A second school of thought, which I term the cognitive school of trust, links trust to inter-
ests and intentions. Rationalist scholars focus on the role of incentives for shaping cooperative
relationships and on signals for indicating behavioral types. While scholars in this area give trust
a more central role for explaining relationships compared to the realist framework, trust is often
considered epiphenominal for cognitivist scholars.
A third school of thought, which I call the affective school of trust, holds that in environments
of uncertainty, trust can precede intentions and independently influence political behavior and in-
ternational politics. Scholars in this school refer to trust in a variety of ways, including moralistic,
behavioral, psychological, binding, normative, and generalized. Regardless of different termi-
nology, scholars in this third area are unified by their understanding of trust as an independent
phenomenon that arises in individual actors and can influence political behavior. The affective
understanding of trust is also more similar to definitions of trust in other social science fields
including psychology and sociology (e.g. Wilson and Eckel, 2010; Maddux and Brewer, 2005;
Rousseau et al., 1998; Luhmann, 1995).
In the following section I distinguish between the cognitive and affective understandings of
trust in greater detail before providing a definition of trust which links both frameworks. Letting
trust stem from either a cognitive or from an affective source allows for an examination of the




Within the field of international relations, trust is typically defined and discussed through a
rationalist framework in which assessments of trustworthiness are based on rationalist calcula-
tions about the interests of others. In this framework actors are considered to be rational utility-
maximizers who trust based on expectations of largely self-interested behavior. The focus on
interests over emotions and psychology makes sense in a field that has been so heavily influenced
by rationalist theory in the past several decades (e.g. Morrow, 1999; Kahler, 1998; Fearon, 1997,
1995). Both Hardin (2006) and Kydd (2005) are each heavily indebted to rationalism in their
development of arguably two of the most important theories of trust in political science to date.
Hardin (2006, 19) defines trust as encapsulated interests, or the idea that trust depends on
“whether my own interests are encapsulated in the interests of the Trusted, that is, on whether the
Trusted counts my interests as partly his or her own interests just because they are my interests.”
For Hardin, actors trust others because they believe it is in the interest of other actors to take their
own interests seriously, and there is a mutual belief that both actors have an interest in maintaining
a relationship through time. For Hardin, love, friendship, or emotions between individuals are less
likely to explain why political actors trust (Hardin, 2006, 20, and see also Hoffman (2006)).
A related understanding is trust as the expectation of reciprocity. This definition is espoused
most clearly by Andrew Kydd, who notes that trust is the belief that another actor is willing to
reciprocate cooperation, or the “belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting
one’s own cooperation” (Kydd, 2005, 3). This definition makes sense in the context of Kydd’s
theory, which is explicitly focused on how trust affects cooperation and how actors demonstrate
credible commitments to a relationship by sending costly signals (see also Kydd, 2000). Kydd is
not alone in emphasizing the importance of reciprocity for cooperation, Axelrod (1984) famously
links reciprocity to cooperation and notes that reciprocity led to trusting relationships across the
trenches in World War II.
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1.1.2 Affective Trust
A growing number of scholars in political science have begun to diverge from the rationalist
conception of trust to discuss the importance of psychological, moral, and normative explanations
for how trust is formed and maintained for individuals. In many ways, these studies are part of a
broader debate about the role of identity and psychology in international relations (see for example
Choi, 2015; Moravcsik, 1997). Rathbun (2011) for example discusses a concept of ‘generalized
trust’, or the idea that by and large, others are trustworthy. For Rathbun, generalized trust arises
as an attribute of individuals, and is moral in nature because it is about the “inherent integrity of
others rather than their interests” (Rathbun, 2011, 244).
Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010) lay out a similar definition of trust, which they term ‘binding
trust’. Binding trust is based on the idea that actors will honor their promises: “It puts emphasis on
the normative meaning that the relationship has for those who establish it” (Ruzicka and Wheeler,
2010, 73). Other scholars have developed similar definitions based on social or moral conceptions
of trust (e.g. Mercer, 2014; Booth and Wheeler, 2008). This sort of trust is also visible in scholars’
accounts of American and Soviet leaders at the end of the Cold War (e.g. Forsberg, 1999; Larson,
1997b). Key for all of these authors is the idea that trust is viewed “in terms of identification and
not as an epiphenomenon of material changes or their perception” (Forsberg, 1999, 605).
Other social science fields tend to think of trust as being more in line with the affective defini-
tion of trust than with the cognitive definition. A group of sociologists and business management
scholars for example define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vul-
nerability based on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al.,
1998, 395).
1.1.3 Comparing Cognitive and Affective Trust
Is the cognitive or the affective conception of trust more important in the context of interna-
tional politics? While the cognitive focus on interests and structure is certainly important, ratio-
nalist theories miss a fundamental aspect of trust: the interpersonal, psychological level which
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underlies human interaction. A number of scholars who emphasize the role of psychology and
emotions have been highly critical of the rationalist approach to trust. Mercer (2014, 519) for
example argues that “rational choice theorists eviscerate the concept [of trust], turning trust into
nothing but incentive-driven behavior.”
Personal characteristics likely influence relationships among political actors. Previous political
scientists have focused on the characteristics of individuals for shaping relationships: Jervis (1970)
for example argues, “when an actor is able to directly observe one of his adversaries he will not only
try to understand the other’s general outlook, but also scrutinize those presumably uncontrolled
aspects of personal behavior that are indices to the adversary’s goals, estimate of the situation,
and resolve” (Jervis, 1970, 32-33). Relatedly, Robert Putnam and co-authors argue that actors’
perceptions of the common underlying values of others encourage cooperation (Putnam, Leonardi,
and Nanetti, 1994, 171).
The affective understanding of trust is weakened however by the failure to comprehensively
account for context, or who trusts whom, and when. Rathbun’s conception of generalized trust for
example rests on the idea that some people trust more than others (see also Dietz, Gillespie, and
Chao, 2010). Other scholars focus on trustworthiness as a trait (e.g. Sztompka, 1999), or on the
idea that people in general are trustworthy (e.g. Uslaner, 2002). While it may be true that some
individuals innately have higher trust ‘levels’ compared to others, it does not seem fair to assume
that actors trust equally across time and space. Rather, who trusts who and when, is likely based
on assessments of a partner as well as the specific context.
The understanding of trust as relational and situational is something that rationalist scholars
capture more clearly: “To say that I trust you in some context is to say that I think you are or will
be trustworthy toward me in that context. You might not be trustworthy toward others and you
might not be trustworthy toward me in other contexts” (Hardin, 2006, 1). Kydd (2005, 6) echoes
this concern for context: “To be trustworthy, with respect to a certain person in a certain context,
is to prefer to return their cooperation rather than exploit them.”3
3An exception among those in the affective group are Booth and Wheeler (2008), who define trust as existing
“when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each other’s attitudes and behavior, believe that the
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While understandings of trust differ across the cognitive and affective accounts of trust, two
common components can be identified that are partly shared by each framework: confident positive
expectations about future conduct and the willingness to be vulnerable and accept risk. These
similarities, discussed in more detail below, allow me to arrive at a definition of trust that links the
cognitive and affective ways of thinking about trust.
1.1.3.1 Confident Positive Expectations About Future Conduct
The first component of trust which most scholars agree upon is the expectation that other actors
will behave benevolently towards them in the future (see for example Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao,
2010; Hardin, 2006; Larson, 1997b). This concept can be unpacked into three distinct parts. First,
actor A must be reasonably certain that actor B has good intentions towards her, and is inclined
to behave in a positive way. Minimally, benevolence implies actors not acting in ways that would
hurt the interests or values of a partner. Maximally, the expectation of positive behavior implies
another promoting or advancing the interests and values of partners (Wheeler, 2009, 428, and see
also Booth and Wheeler (2008)). Second, actor A must be reasonably certain that actor B’s positive
intentions are unlikely to change in the future. In other words, intentions should be relatively
predictable and time-invariant. Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao (2010, 11) note that after actors make
initial judgments about the motives, character, and reliability of potential partners, they then make
a calculation or prediction about how future conduct will align with current behavior.4 Third, actor
A must be reasonably certain that in addition to positive intentions, actor B is also able to follow
through on her intentions, or can do what she says or promises. In other words, how confident can
one be that another actor can follow through on her promises?5
other(s) now and in the future, can be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests
and values.”
4The extent to which political leaders value or discount the future is an outstanding question I address in Chapter
5.
5See Larson (1997b, 714) and Hardin (2006, 36,70) for more on this point.
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1.1.3.2 Vulnerability and Risk
The second key component in defining trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability, or equiv-
alently the willingness to put oneself at risk. Both Larson (1997a) and Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao
(2010) note that accepting risk is key in addition to establishing positive expectations: “Trust goes
beyond expectation because it entails placing one’s fate or welfare in another’s hands” (Larson,
1997a, 19). Other authors likewise note that the willingness to accept risk is intimately tied to
judgments about the benevolent intentions of other actors. Actors choose to place their fate par-
tially in the hands of another actor based on the expectation that others will protect their interests
(Rathbun, 2011; Hoffman, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998).
Actors accept risk because they calculate that the probability of negative consequences are
sufficiently low. While the likelihood of injury may be low, there is always the possibility of
miscalculation or changes through time which could lead to a betrayal of trust. Thus, Hardin (2006,
28) notes, “it is pointless to say you trust someone unless there is some risk of your suffering a loss
if that someone does not fulfill your trust,” and Wheeler (2009, 437) similarly notes that “to trust
to any degree is always to risk betrayal.”6 At the same time, trust and risk should be considered
analytically separate categories since risk-taking usually occurs in response to a calculation of
a low-probability event, while trust occurs due to the expectation of an event perceived to be
relatively likely (Deutsch, 1958, 266).7
1.1.4 Defining Trust
Should the cognitive or affective definition of trust then be preferred for thinking about pol-
itics? The discussion above illuminates significant similarities between the two understandings.
Trust involves accepting a certain amount of risk, which in the political context stems from preva-
lent uncertainty about the intentions and beliefs of others. Trust also involves believing in the
6A crucial distinction needs to be made about the relationship between trust and risk. While trust by definition
involves the willingness to assume risk, taking risks does not necessarily imply the presence of trust. There are a
number of reasons actors may choose to take risks in the absence of trust, including coercion (see also Hoffman, 2006,
25).
7Deutsch also points out that trust and risk are separate due to different ratios of expected positive and negative
emotional consequences.
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benevolent intentions of other actors. These two components remain constant in both the rational-
ist and non-rationalist framework. Thus a consistent definition of trust is:
Definition: Believing, despite uncertainty, that another will not act in a way that hurts me.8
What differs between the cognitive and affective accounts is the source of the belief about
intentions, or the mechanism through which actors form beliefs about others. When do actors
believe that others will act in a way that will not injure them? Cognitivists hold that the source of
belief about intentions arises from a rational calculation about the interests of another actor, either
focusing on encapsulated interests or expected reciprocation. In other words, information about the
trustworthiness of others is generated through an assessment of encapsulated interests (according
to Hardin), or through the expectation of reciprocity (according to Kydd).
Affectivists by contrast hold that the belief in another’s benevolence is due to some sort of
emotional or psychological feeling about the intentions of others. While there is a consensus
understanding about the source of the cognitive belief in trust, the precise mechanism that underlies
affective trust is less obvious. From where does a feeling or an emotion about the intentions of
others arise from? Answering this question is key to understanding the affective pathway through
which information about another’s trustworthiness is determined (See Figure 1.1).
To address this gap I focus on developing a theory of how and when individual leaders are more
likely to trust one another, based on theories from social psychology and neuroscience. Before
turning to theory in the next chapter however, it is important to clarify how trust relates to two
other concepts: cooperation and reputation. Reputation and cooperation have both received broad
attention in the field of international relations, and are often connected to the idea of trust. It is
important however to understand how and why these concepts differ.
8This definition is most similar to one offered by Adler and Barnett (1998, 46) in their discussion of security
communities. Adler and Barnett define trust as “believing despite uncertainty.” While this definition captures the
component of trust which is tied to risk, it does not identify what is being believed. Adler and Barrett go on to argue
that trust depends on assesments about whether others will act in ways consistent with normative expectations, though
this understanding fails to address whether normative expectations are directed in a positive or negative manner.
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Figure 1.1: Mechanisms generating trust under cognitive and affective frameworks.









Trust is often thought to explain cooperation, since actors that trust each other may be more
willing to cooperate (e.g. Hardin, 2006, 35). Along these lines, Larson (1997b, 704) argues that
trust “is usually a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for states to cooperate.” While trust
and cooperation are linked then, they differ in that while cooperation is an overt behavior that may
be caused by trust, trust is an underlying condition, and neither a behavior nor a choice (Rousseau
et al., 1998, 395). If trusting relationships are visible indicators of trust, then trusting relationships
are “special forms of cooperation that combine delegation with trusting attitudes, two elements
other forms of cooperation lack in tandem” (Hoffman, 2006, 25).
In addition to separating trust from cooperation, it is also important to acknowledge that trust
does not always lead to cooperation, and cooperation is not always based on trust. Axelrod (1984,
174) identified the ability to garner cooperation absent trust early on, noting that when players
can expect reciprocity, trust is not needed. Others, including Hoffman (2002, 376) have argued
that defining cooperation as a visible indicator of trust is problematic, since cooperation can occur
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without trust, for example if an actor is coerced into engaging in cooperative behavior. Thus, while
trust has been thought of and measured as cooperation, trust and cooperation are theoretically and
analytically distinct concepts.
1.1.4.2 Reputation
In addition to cooperation, reputation is a term which is often conflated with trust. Mercer
(1996, 6) defines reputation as “a judgment of someone’s character (or disposition) that is then
used to predict or explain future behavior.” Reputation has been an important concept for several
centuries, with David Hume tying concern for reputation to self-interested individuals helping each
other as early as 1792. Discussing two corn farmers, one whose crops need harvesting today and
the other tomorrow, Hume (1994, 37) argues the farmers may help each other “because I foresee
that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain
the same correspondence of good offices with me or with others. And accordingly, after I have
served him, and he is in possession of the advantage arising from my action, he is induced to
perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal” (emphasis added). The concept
of reputation has enjoyed a rigorous revival in the field of international security in recent years,
especially in the area of alliance politics (e.g. Narang and LeVeck, 2017; Crescenzi et al., 2012;
Gibler, 2008). As Hardin (2006, 24) points out, reputation is not solely important for predicting
how others will behave, but also because actors likely feel incentives to maintain a good reputation:
“Once you have a good reputation, you are likely to want to maintain it and that fact gives me
confidence to undertake dealings with you.”
While cooperation and reputation are thus intimately connected to the concept of trust, they
are unique concepts. Reputation is one factor that contributes to trust. In Chapter 4 for example I
include measures of reputation to help explain why states form alliances. Cooperation by contrast
can be built on trust, and cooperation can also potentially lead to changing levels of trust if it allows
for leaders to recognize or develop shared identities.9
9See Chapter 5 for more on this point.
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Reputation⇒ Trust⇔ Cooperation
Scholars have separated these three concepts by viewing trust, an underlying latent condition,
separately from trusting behavior or trusting relationships (e.g. Hoffman, 2002, 377, and see also
Keating and Ruzicka (2014); Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010)). Separating these concepts allows for
the recognition that observable, trusting relationships are not the same as trust, rather they are
produced when individuals act on the belief that others are trustworthy and place control over
interests into the hands of another. Rationalist accounts of trust are more prone to conflating
trust and cooperation; affective accounts of trust avoid confusion by focusing on sociological and
psychological examinations of personality and background to assess behavior.
1.1.5 Why Is Trust Important?
Trust is important and valuable in both social and political relations. In the social context, Lar-
son (1997a, 19) notes, “being able to trust others is essential for personal and social relationships.
Without the capacity for trust, we would be paranoid, unable to confide in friends, suspicious of
the government, even unable to eat our food.” Of course, even political relations are composed of
social beings, and as such, “the question of whom to trust and how far is as central a question of
political life as it is of personal life” (John Dunn quoted in Booth and Wheeler, 2008, 229).
Within the sphere of politics, trust is arguably the most important, and also the most ignored in
the area of international conflict and security.10 In international politics, trusting another leader or
country can lead to deleterious consequences, including annihilation or war. And yet these are the
contexts in which the role of trust could potentially be the largest. When actors need to cooperate
in comparatively low trust environments, the cost of cooperation is higher, because for cooperation
to be successful, structures and procedures need to be built and established to take the place of
10By comparison, the concept of trust has been given extensive attention in discussion of public opinion and do-
mestic political support for government (e.g. Van de Walle and Six, 2014; Brewer et al., 2004; Mishler and Rose,
2001; Levi and Stoker, 2000), though scholars have been critical of this research. Hardin (2006, 43-4) for example
argues,“the point of such research is to go no further than to show that people ostensibly do trust.”
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trust. On the other hand, when actors find it easier to trust each other, they are more likely to
cooperate, even in situations in which cooperation is not expected (e.g. Dion, 1973).
Keating and Ruzicka (2014), drawing on work from Niklas Luhmann, argue that trust can be
thought of as “the ideational structure that cognitively reduces the residual risk and uncertainty that
is part of any decision.” Trust then can simplify many of the complexities inherent under anarchy,
making it easier and cheaper to form long-lasting agreements and understanding. Similarly, Us-
laner (2002, 2) argues that trust makes cooperation both cheaper and easier: “when we trust other
people, we don’t have to face every opportunity to cooperate as a new decision.” Some scholars go
so far as to argue that by establishing trust, states can “transcend the security dilemma,” suggesting
“the potential for transformation in political relations even under the conditions of international
anarchy” (Keating and Ruzicka, 2014, 755).
History also demonstrates the need for more comprehensive treaties and agreements when
trust is low. During the Cold War for example, President Reagan became well known for his
“Doveryai, no proveryai,” or “trust but verify” ideology (Wilson, 2014). Since states can get around
most verification systems with enough effort, crafting effective verification systems depends on
the degree to which states trust each other not to cheat. In other words, “what states demand of
an enforcement system depends in part on their beliefs about the likelihood that the other will
cheat – that is, on levels of trust. Without some trust, a system of monitoring and inspection for
an arms control agreement might have to meet such stringent requirements as to be infeasible
or prohibitively expensive” (Larson, 1997a, 706). While perhaps hyperbolic, President Reagan
also reportedly told Secretary Gorbachev that if the two nations could learn to trust one another,
“then those mountains of weapons will disappear quickly as we will be confident that they are not
needed” (Yarhi-Milo, 2014, 196).
The role of trust in international politics then is important to study and understand, both be-
cause trust can lead to cheaper, simpler cooperation between nations, and because trust is still an
under-studied concept in international relations. As the previous discussion elucidates, far too lit-
tle attention has been afforded to the examination of affective trust between political actors. This
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omission is especially notable in light of the increased attention on the role of leaders and indi-
viduals in international politics (e.g. Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2015; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011;
Debs and Goemans, 2010; Hymans, 2006). While political science as a field recognizes the impor-
tance of the third image for explaining broad patterns of conflict and cooperation, relatively little is
known about what causes positive and negative interactions between leaders, and the implications
of interpersonal relationships between political leaders for international politics. This dissertation
contributes to the renewed interest in microfoundations in political science, and particularly to the
role of leaders in influencing international political relations.
1.2 Identity
In the previous section I defined trust as believing, despite uncertainty, that another will not
act in a way that hurts me. The mechanism through which an individual comes to trust another
differs according to the cognitive and the affective pathways. For cognitivists, individuals gather
information about the trustworthiness of others through an understanding of encapsulated interests
or through the expectation of reciprocity. Affectivist scholars by contrast attribute the formation
of trust to emotional or psychological sources, but are not clear about how trust between indi-
viduals forms based on these factors. To understand the role of trust between leaders, I focus on
developing this missing mechanism, both because the affective understanding of trust is less well
understood within the field of political science, and because leaders are individuals who are prone
to psychological biases, just like other humans.
It seems likely that leaders rely on both affective and cognitive processes for decision-making.
Thus it is important to understand and evaluate the role of both. To what extent does each type of
trust matter in international politics. What is the role of feelings and emotions compared to the role
of rationalist processes in politics? In my empirical chapters on nuclear cooperation agreements,
nuclear proliferation under extended deterrence, and alliance formation, I account for strategic
factors as well as my measure designed to capture the interpersonal relationship between leaders.
The first step for understanding the source of affective trust is to ask the question of what causes
an actor to believe that another will not hurt them? To answer this question I turn to theories
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and discussions in other social science fields about shared identity, as well as to evidence from
neuroscience (see Chapter 2). The basis of my theory of trust in social identity is not new: scholars
in sociology, psychology, and other fields have long focused on the role of identity in interpersonal
relationships. What is new is the translation of these concepts to the political realm, and the
application of these theories to international politics.
Despite the tendency in much of the literature in political science to marginalize the study of
trust by claiming trust cannot occur between political actors in environments of uncertainty, there
are vibrant examinations of trust in many fields, including psychology (e.g. Maddux and Brewer,
2005; Brewer, 1979; Schlenker, Helm, and Tedeschi, 1973; Rotter, 1967), sociology (e.g. Moller-
ing, 2001; Luhmann, 1995; Shapiro, 1987), economics (e.g. Wilson and Eckel, 2010; Cox, 2004;
Eckel and Wilson, 2004), philosophy (e.g. Becker, 1996; Jones, 1996), biology and neuroscience
(e.g. Zak, Kurzban, and Matzner, 2005; Rilling et al., 2004; DeBruine, 2002) and business manage-
ment (e.g. Saunders et al., 2010; Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006; Nyhan, 1999; Parkhe, 1998; Rousseau
et al., 1998).
There is also a growing literature in political science that draws from these diverse traditions.
Indeed, some political scientists recognize that realists’ primary critique for why trust cannot exist,
uncertainty, is the primary reason why political trust needs to be understood in greater detail.
Rather than trust and uncertainty being antithetical, “if humans had certainty about the motives
and intentions of others, they would not need trust. Trust is one of the mechanisms by which
humans try to cope with life’s risks and uncertainties” (Wheeler, 2009, 435).11
1.2.1 Defining Identity
Identity is defined as “role-specific understandings . . . about self” in relation to others (Choi,
2015, 114). This definition makes clear that identity is inherently relational and based on social
11Hoffman (2006, 18-19) makes a similar argument, noting that in the field of international relations, it is common
for scholars to “presume that trusting interstate relationships emerge when potential trustee states “commit” themselves
to particular outcomes.” For these scholars, the logic goes that commitments make the future behavior of others
more certain by making it more difficult for others to renege on commitments, making it easier to trust (see Fearon,
1995). By creating certainty about future behavior however, commitments replace the need for trust in relationships:
“it is a mistake to describe commitments as fostering trust on particular issues because binding commitments make
exploitation impossible.”
16
interaction, and that every actor can have, and likely has, multiple identities. The degree to which
actors are tied to particular identities may differ depending on both time and context, but “each
identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors col-
lectively hold about themselves and one another” (Wendt, 1992, 398). Adler and Barnett (1998,
47) emphasize the point that identities are formed based on interaction with others. Identities are
“not only personal and psychological, but are social, defined by the actor’s interaction with and
relationship to others.” In political science, many argue that identities form the basis of interests
(see for example Hopf, 2002; Cronin, 1999; Wendt, 1992).
The concept of identity relates to a large literature about how individuals structure, simplify,
and give meaning to the space around them. In discussing social identity, or how an individual is
defined within a social context, Tajfel (1978, 63) states that individuals engage in the categorization
of themselves and others to systemize and simplify their environment. In other words, social
categorization can be thought of as a “system of orientation which helps to create and define the
individual’s place in society.” Thus identity is created in part by continually defining the self in
relation to others across all possible categories of identity.
It is relatively easy to see how self-identity, as formed in relation to others, can translate into a
shared group identity, since identity is formed by comparing traits among different people. Indeed,
it is common to define identity in relation to groups. Cronin (1999, 5) for example defines identities
as “a set of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is recognizable as a mem-
ber of a group.” The idea of group identity, or the ability and desire to discriminate between those
with similar traits and those that are dissimilar from the self, is the basis of my understanding of
interpersonal political trust. In the following section I discuss theories about ingroup and outgroup
bias, then link these theories to what I call embedded identity and the creation of interpersonal
political trust.
1.2.2 Identity, Interpersonal Relationships, and Trust
The origins of theories about ingroup outgroup bias are linked to sociologist William Sumner.
In 1906, Sumner developed a theory of ethnocentrism, or the differentiation of people into ethnic
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groups for the “struggle of existence” (Brewer, 1979, 307). According to Sumner (1906, 12),
“the insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to
each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder . . . Loyalty
to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness
without – all grow together, common products of the same situation.” More recently, Hammond
and Axelrod (2006, 926) have defined the characteristics of ethnocentrism as including seeing one’s
own group as “virtuous and superior, one’s own standards of value as universal, and out-groups as
contemptible and inferior.”
The paradigmatic theory that addresses this phenomenon is Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory
(SIT), which Tajfel developed to explain why individuals consistently prefer members of their own
self-identified group to others. Tajfel (1978) argues that individuals engage in categorization of the
identities of others to systemize and simplify their environment. In the process of categorization,
though, it is common to make value judgments about others, especially when the categories are
important to the individual. Moreover, “these value differentials tend to enhance still further the
subjective differences on certain dimensions between the categories” (Tajfel, 1978, 62). Thus the
unconscious categorization of others’ identities can lead to the perception of difference between the
self and others. Discrimination against others may be magnified by the subconscious desire to feel
good about one’s own group or identity. This argument is supported by Wilson and Eckel (2010,
12), who argue that “stereotyping is the result of a natural human tendency to categorize, and
often operates as a heuristic shortcut,” and that, “judgments of others often exaggerate underlying
differences among populations.”
There have been several attempts in political science to incorporate sociological and psycho-
logical conceptions about how perceptions of others’ identity leads to ingroup favoritism and trust,
especially in the nuclear context. Larson (1997a,b) for example advances a psychological theory
of mistrust to explain why policymakers fail to agree. She argues that American and Soviet leaders
failed to cooperate on arms control because of mistrust driven by ideological differences, historical
baggage, and mental biases. Larson (1997a, 22) makes the point that how individuals interpret
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behavior depends on how they view others, and what they believe about the character of others:
“Whether we describe Jane’s silence in the elevator this morning as aloof, pre-occupied, cold, or
hostile depends on whether Jane is a friend, casual acquaintance, stranger, or rival.”
Booth and Wheeler (2008) define trust as “two or more actors, based on the mutual interpreta-
tion of each other’s attitudes and behavior, believ[ing] that the other(s) now and in the future, can
be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests and values.”
The mutual identification of trusting relationships for Booth and Wheeler is made possible by sev-
eral properties: a risky leap into the dark, empathy or bonding, dependence and vulnerability, and
integrity, meaning confidence that another will honor their promises. While Booth and Wheeler
offer some examples of each of these processes at work, the lack of a broad systematic analysis
makes it difficult to understand which of these many mechanisms is most important for generating
trust.
1.2.3 Trust and Embedded Identity
Evidence across the social sciences suggests that people are more likely to trust those they are
similar to. In the United States for example, surveys indicate that people are more likely to trust
their family, fellow Americans, neighbors, and those who attend the same church or club (Us-
laner, 2002, 19–30). Likewise, experiments show that trust decreases as social distance increases
(Buchan, Croson, and Dawes, 2002). Indeed, Macy and Skvoretz (1998, 651) go so far as to argue
that “the earliest trust rule is based on social distance – trust neighbors, but not outsiders” (see also
Ellison, 1993). What causes people to trust those with similar identities?
Some scholars hold that the mere establishment of a group or a sense of shared identity can
lead to ingroup favoritism (see for example Tyler and Dawes, 1998; Dawes, Van de Kragt, and
Orbell, 1988). In other words, “simply knowing that an otherwise unknown person is a member of
a salient ingroup may be sufficient to engender trust as a default assumption” (Maddux and Brewer,
2005, 161, and see also Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna (1996)). Shared category membership then
becomes a basis for trust because of the shared identity (e.g. Buchan, Croson, and Dawes, 2002;
Yamagashi and Kiyonari, 2000; Macy and Skvoretz, 1998). This occurs because people internalize
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the identities that are important to them, then relate to others with the same identities as part of an
“us”, meaning “those whom we trust, toward whom we are okay, and for whose problems we care
in the spirit of solidarity” (Sztompka, 1999, 5). Discussing how trust can arise between strangers,
Uslaner (2002, 18) argues that “each side sees something that binds it to the other.” People with
shared identities may also calculate that trusting is less risky (see for example Wilson and Eckel,
2010; Bohnet, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser, 2008; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). Despite the
numerous claims and wealth of evidence from across many fields that shared identity leads to trust
however, there is not a strong theoretical reason why this might be the case.
Consider two individuals, called A and B. For A to trust B on a particular issue, A needs to
consider both how she views the issue and the extent to which she prefers cooperating with B
over competing with B, and how B likely views the issue and ranks cooperation in comparison to
competition. Since it is impossible for A to have complete information about B’s thoughts, beliefs,
and intentions, A needs some way to make assessments about what is likely to be true for B.
While rationalists would turn to costly signals as an indicator of intentions, I argue that under the
affective pathway, actors may determine the intentions and trustworthiness of others based at least
in part on identity. When two actors share more similar identities, it is easier to understand what
the other’s position might be, easier to empathize, and easier to understand how the other views
the world. This process is likely unconscious most of the time, such that shared identity acts as
an internal mental shortcut which contributes to an individual’s decision about the likelihood that
another can be trusted. When individuals do not share identities, especially if they have identities
that are opposed in such a way to be threatening, it is not as easy to understand the other, and the
threatening identity may even provide negative information about the intentions of the other.
Evidence from neuroscience suggests that people act on similar mental shortcuts in everyday
life. Todorov, Pakrashi, and Oosterhof (2009) for example show that people automatically make
judgments about the trustworthiness of others based on facial appearances: “personal impressions
are often formed rapidly and spontaneously from minimal information.” There is evidence that the
brain makes a judgment about how trustworthy someone is in as little as 100 milliseconds based on
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characteristics of other people (Engell, Haxby, and Todorov, 2007, 1515). Not only does the brain
make a nearly instantaneous judgment, but when someone senses that another is untrustworthy, the
amygdala, or the brain’s fear center, is activated to produce an emotional response. Observable,
knowable characteristics then are thought to be a source of information that allows for a mental
shortcut to judge the trustworthiness of others.
If identities are a source of information which reduce uncertainty about the intentions of others,
then the cognitive and affective understandings of trust are further linked. Through each pathway,
individuals use information to make judgements about unknown intentions of others. Rationalists
argue that individuals look to past behavior, signals of intention, and interest alignment to deter-
mine how trustworthy someone is. I argue that in addition to these factors, individuals also use
identities as a heuristic shortcut to form opinions about the trustworthiness of others (See Figure
1.2).
Figure 1.2: Mechanisms generating trust under cognitive and affective frameworks, revised.









Based on investigations of trust and identity in other fields then, I argue that individuals gauge
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whether or not they can trust another actor based on how embedded their identities are, or how
much of their social identity they share. Trust will be easier when individuals have a high degree
of embedded identity, defined as the degree of social closeness between two actors. There are
of course many different factors that can contribute to identity, including gender, religion, and
ethnicity. An important question is what sort of identities can trigger trusting relationships. While
there is evidence of “a strong individual predisposition toward bias in favor of in-groups” even
when group distinctions are very arbitrary (for example groups formed around appreciating either
Klein or Kandinsky paintings), it may also be the case that identity needs to be salient to generate
a feeling of trust (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006, 926). Kramer (1989, 90) for example argues
that “when the salience of a social category is too low, individuals perceive themselves to be in an
aggregate of strangers rather than part of a group” (see also Brewer and Kramer, 1985).
On the other hand, many scholars hold that very little in the way of categorization is needed in
order for individuals to align themselves with others as an identifiable group. Tajfel et al. (1971,
235) for example argue that “the mere perception by subjects that they belong to two distinct social
categories is alone sufficient for intergroup discrimination,” while Doise and Sinclair (1973) argue
that simply the awareness of an out-group leads to ingroup bias. This group of scholars usually
holds that “any categorization rule that provides a basis for classifying an individual as belonging to
one social grouping as distinct from another can be sufficient to produce differentiation of attitudes
toward the two groups” (Brewer, 1979, 308).
Experimental evidence shows that the types of identities that are salient are quite diverse: for
example in a trust game in which Stanford undergraduates and Stanford MBA students were told
to allocate resources to their own security, much more money was spent on security when un-
dergraduates were told the opposing player was an MBA student, and vice versa, compared to
when the opponent was from the same group. Even more telling, when asked to identify the rea-
son for increased allocation of funds, participants stated that the opponent was more threatening
when they were not from the same educational group. Kramer (1989, 82) argues that the need for
greater security when intergroup distinctions are salient is because “social differentiation increases
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competitive orientations.”
Research also demonstrates that in conflictual environments, the barrier for ingroup favoritism
and outgroup negativity is much lower, meaning that in political environments, a tendency for nega-
tivity towards others who do not share common identities would be likely to exist: “whether actual
or imagined, the perception that an outgroup constitutes a threat to ingroup interests or survival
creates a circumstance in which identification and interdependence with the ingroup is directly
associated with fear and hostility toward the threatening outgroup and vice versa . . . ” (Brewer,
1999, 435-436).12 Others have found that ingroup bias arises due to hostility (Sherif, 1966) and
competition (Blake and Mouton, 1962). Since international politics is perpetually competitive, it is
reasonable to assume that many forms of identity could contribute to the perception of similarities
and dissimilarities between leaders. In Chapter 2 I continue this discussion, focusing on important,
formative identities that are likely to shape how an actor views herself and others.
1.2.4 Previous Literature on Leaders, Identity, and Trust
The transformation of relationships between Soviet and American leaders on nuclear issues at
the end of the Cold War is perhaps the area in which scholars have focused the most on the role of
trust and mistrust in international politics (e.g. Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Forsberg, 1999; Larson,
1997a). Before taking office, President Reagan wrote in a letter to a friend, “I don’t really trust
the Soviets . . . and I don’t really believe that they will really join us in a legitimate limitation of
arms agreement” (Wilson, 2014, 17). Reagan even announced publicly in 1983 that the Soviet
Union was an “evil empire” (Prados, 2011, 31). In response to a question later in his presidency
however about whether he could have previously imagined going to Moscow for a summit, Reagan
answered, “probably not, because very frankly, I have to say I think there is a difference between
this General Secretary [Gorbachev] and other leaders of your country that I had met in the past
. . . And no, I could not have foreseen your present leader” (Hall and Yarhi-Milo, 2012, 570).
12Brewer (1999) is concerned with the assumption that love for members of ingroups corresponds to hatred for
members of outgroups. With the exception of Allport (1954/1988), she notes that many scholars assume that prefer-
ential bias to ingroups implies negativity to outgroups. By contrast, Brewer argues that social identification may not
always lead to negative bias towards outgroup members (but see also LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Sherif and Sherif,
1953, for a discussion of realistic conflict theory of inter-group relations).
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President Reagan’s belief that Secretary Gorbachev was a “different type of leader” is clear
from many accounts of the end of the Cold War. Lebow and Herrmann (2004, 183) for example
argue that “confronted with a different General Secretary, who had neither Secretary Gorbachev’s
personality nor his commitment to reduce the nuclear threat, President Reagan might have re-
mained an anti-Soviet ideologue,” implying that the chemistry between Secretary Gorbachev and
President Reagan as well as their personal rapport allowed for a more trusting relationship. There
are a number of things Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan seem to have identified over.
For one, Secretary Gorbachev was less entrenched in Communist ideology and Marxist theory
compared to previous Soviet leaders, and had attended University for a law degree (in contrast,
previous Soviet leaders had mostly technical educations). Secretary Gorbachev and President Rea-
gan also reportedly connected over their families, and the importance of family values to both of
them.
These two leaders were able to trust each other in part because they were able to identify
with each other more closely compared to their previous counterparts. President Reagan’s own
statements about Secretary Gorbachev highlight this view. The President noted for example that
improved relations were largely due to “Mr. Gorbachev as a leader”, rather than to having new or
increased information about the Soviet Union or any other factors. President Reagan also said he
found Secretary Gorbachev “completely different than others that I had dealt with” (Hall and Yarhi-
Milo, 2012, 570,569). In part due to this relationship, “the overwhelming suspicion characteristic
of the Cold War was gradually replaced by trust – not blind trust, but trust,” according to US
diplomat Jack Matlock (Matlock, 2004, 319).
For his part, Secretary Gorbachev recognized the importance of individual leaders and their
personalities and characteristics for diplomacy. Anatoly Chernyaev, one of Secretary Gorbachev’s
closest advisers, recalled that after returning from Washington DC in 1987, Secretary Gorbachev
addressed the Politburo by saying the summit demonstrated “how much the human factor means
in international politics . . . it turns out that politicians, including leaders of governments if they
are really responsible people, represent purely human concerns, interests, and the hope of ordinary
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people . . . In our age, it turns out, this has the biggest impact on political decisions” (Booth and
Wheeler, 2008, 156).
While the arrival of Secretary Gorbachev into office allowed for at least the partial transforma-
tion of US-Soviet relations on nuclear issues, Soviet relations did not improve with every country
in the same way. While I would expect this to be the case, since I argue that trust depends on the
dyadic interaction between particular leaders, it is useful to look at a comparison of Soviet relations
with other countries. Forsberg (1999) does this by comparing Secretary Gorbachev’s acquiescence
of German reunification to continued conflict with Japan over the Kurile Islands. Despite the Ger-
man issue being arguably much more important to the Soviet Union compared to the island dispute,
Germany and the USSR were able to come to a resolution while Japan and the USSR were not.
Forsberg (1999, 616) ties this to the personal understanding between Secretary Gorbachev and
German Chancellor Kohl: “as leaders of their states, Secretary Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl
were the key players who mediated the trust between the two states.” Once again, Secretary Gor-
bachev’s own statements highlight the role of trust between leaders for international relations.
Referring to Chancellor Kohl, Secretary Gorbachev said: “we did not negotiate as partners but as
people who trusted each other. All this enabled us to achieve a high degree of mutual understanding
in all fields of politics” (Forsberg, 1999, 617-618). In contrast, there was no such understanding
between Secretary Gorbachev and Japanese politicians at the time. Forsberg argues this distinc-
tion was due at least in part to both the Soviets and Germans viewing themselves as part of a new
common European identity, while Soviets saw both a “historical and cultural gap” with Japan.
Robertson (2010, 157) supports this view, arguing that “to the Soviets the Japanese [were] still
very much an alien race with which they have had comparatively little contact and correspond-
ingly little substantial experience.” In Chapter 2 I continue the discussion of the role of shared
identities between leaders for trusting relationships. Prior to this, I provide a brief overview of the
dissertation.
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1.3 Overview of Dissertation
In Chapter 2, I first discuss and develop my theory of how shared backgrounds between leaders
can make trust and cooperation more likely. I then focus on the context of nuclear cooperation and
argue that shared identity between leaders makes cooperation more likely by increasing interper-
sonal trust. Leaders who share more similar social identities are more likely to trust each other,
while leaders who have divergent social identities find it more difficult to trust. To test this the-
ory, I use data on nuclear cooperation agreements and leaders’ social identities in the period from
1950-2002, including early and adult life identities, socio-economic status, and political ideology.
Statistical analysis shows that leaders who share similar social identities are more likely to engage
in nuclear cooperation, even while controlling for strategic factors known to influence cooperation.
An examination of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rapprochement illustrates these findings.
In Chapter 3 I examine the willingness of client states to rely on promises from their patron
states for protection. In particular, I focus on when non-nuclear weapon states will pursue au-
tonomous nuclear development versus refraining from nuclear pursuit, holding the defense com-
mitment of a nuclear patron state constant. While previous scholars argue that extended deterrent
guarantees are a key tool for limiting proliferation, the efficacy of these guarantees depends on the
credibility of the commitment to both potential adversaries as well as to the client state. Prior lit-
erature points to specific signals patrons can send to try and make their commitments appear more
credible – including basing conventional forces or foreign nuclear deployments in an ally’s terri-
tory or sending interpersonal signals through speeches and visits by leaders. I argue that leaders
who are protected through a nuclear umbrella are more likely to engage in nuclear restraint when
they share more background characteristics with their patron state leader, since trust is easier when
two individuals are more similar. To test my theory I use data on nuclear pursuit, defense alliances,
and leadership backgrounds in the period from 1945–2000. Evidence suggests that client state
leaders are less likely to engage in nuclear-related activity when they are protected by a nuclear
weapon state with a more similar leader.
In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of whether interpersonal relationships between leaders in-
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fluence the likelihood of two states entering into an international alliance. Prior literature is divided
on the question of why states form alliances. Some scholars argue that security imperatives, most
notably the presence of a joint enemy, lead to alliance formation. Others argue that ideological
similarities between states, especially the presence of similar political regimes, makes alliance for-
mation more likely. Still others claim that leaders judge whether or not to form alliances with
other states based on the reputation of foreign leaders or governments for upholding prior com-
mitments. Each of these explanations is surely important for understanding when and why states
ally together, and are also linked in a key way. Each of these theories address a central concern of
states when considering whether to form an alliance: the potential costliness of betrayal, and the
inability to truly know and trust the intentions of another actor. I suggest an additional explanation
for why states form alliances: the ability of leaders in potential allied states to empathize and un-
derstand their partner leader based on the similarity of their backgrounds. To test my theory I use
data on alliance formation, reputation, and leaders’ identities in the period from 1840–2000. My
statistical analysis demonstrates that two states are more likely to form an alliance with each other
when their leaders are more similar, even while accounting for the historical relationship between
the two states, their reputation for reliability, and other factors thought to affect the probability of
alliance formation.
The final chapter of the dissertation concludes by summarizing the central arguments and find-
ings made in Chapters 2-4, discussing the major implications of this research, and suggesting areas
for future study based on weaknesses of the current manuscript and questions that have arisen
during the development of the dissertation.
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2. LEADERS, SHARED IDENTITY, AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION
Do relationships between leaders influence cooperation in world politics? There is a grow-
ing recognition in scholarship that leaders play a key role in world politics (e.g. Kertzer, 2016;
Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2015; Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Colgan, 2013; Saunders, 2011). Most
studies in the growing literature on leadership focus on individual leaders in isolation, theorizing
about how individual leader backgrounds and characteristics influence a wide array of political out-
comes. Politics are usually relational however, meaning that the interactions between leaders and
the ways in which they view one another should be considered alongside monadic factors.1 This
chapter considers dyadic relationships between leaders, focusing on indicators that other leaders
can easily observe or know about another. It links leader-level shared experiences to political
outcomes, suggesting that relationships between leaders broadly influence international politics.
Everyday life experience as well as research in other disciplines make clear that identity con-
tributes to relationships between people and influences whether individuals are willing to coop-
erate. At the same time, many political scientists have downplayed or ignored identity as an im-
portant factor for explaining cooperation, focusing instead on the role of political institutions (e.g.
Martin, 2000; Leeds, 1999) and structural factors (e.g. Snidal, 1991; Grieco, 1988). This chapter
provides evidence consistent with the view that identity politics are important for understanding
the role of leaders in international politics.
In particular, I argue that shared identity between leaders makes cooperation easier by increas-
ing trust in another. Leaders who share more similar backgrounds and experiences are more likely
to trust each other, while leaders who have divergent social identities find it more difficult to trust.
This argument is based on theories and evidence from social psychology and neuroscience, which
indicate that trust increases as social distance decreases. I test this theory in the context of nuclear
1Wheeler (2018) and Holmes and Yarhi-Milo (2017) do much to advance our understanding of leader relationships,
but they focus on face-to-face interactions based on the analysis of specific leader relationships. More often than not,
however, leaders need to form at least their initial impression of others without in-person interaction. The intersection
of interactive accounts with my Theory are discussed in Chapter 5.
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cooperation agreements, finding that shared identities make nuclear cooperation more likely, even
while accounting for strategic factors known to influence nuclear cooperation. Shared identities
between leaders, including shared early life experiences, gender, social status, adult identities, and
military background, increase the likelihood of nuclear cooperation across multiple model spec-
ifications, samples, and while accounting for domestic political constraints and leaders’ political
ideology. This finding is particularly strong in recipient countries with low levels of domestic
political constraint, since leaders in these environments are more able to follow through on their
promises to refrain from using nuclear assistance for military purposes.
This chapter proceeds in four main sections. In the next section I expand on the concept of
identity and turn to theories and evidence from social psychology and neuroscience to motivate
my theory for how shared identities between leaders make cooperation easier. In the second sec-
tion I examine cooperation on nuclear issues in particular to understand how personal relationships
between leaders can allow for cooperation, even in the most intractable of circumstances. In the
third section I engage in an empirical analysis of shared leader identities and nuclear cooperation
agreements. I then illustrate my findings with a discussion of nuclear rapprochement between
Brazil and Argentina. The empirical analysis indicates the importance of shared identity for ex-
plaining nuclear cooperation, especially in countries with low levels of political constraint. In the
final section I summarize my findings and identify opportunities for further research based on the
nuclear context.
2.1 Leadership, Identity, and Cooperation
As noted in Chapter 1, the basis of my theory of cooperation based on shared social identity
is not new: scholars in sociology, psychology, and neuroscience have long focused on the role
of identity in interpersonal relationships. What is new is the translation of these concepts to the
political realm, and the application of these theories to the realm of international security. In
particular, I link the focus on identity and relationships between actors with the growing interest
on leaders in international relations to explain cooperation in world politics. To do this, it is first
important to have a clear understanding of what identity is.
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Identity is defined as understanding the self and others (Jenkins, 2014, 19), and as a set of
characteristics that allow a person to be recognizable as part of a group (Cronin, 1999, 5).2 These
definitions make clear that identity is inherently relational and based on social interaction, and
that every actor can have, and likely has, multiple identities. The degree to which actors are tied
to particular identities may differ depending on both time and context, but each identity is social
and based on how actors view themselves in relation to others (Wendt (1992, 398) and Adler and
Barnett (1998, 47)).
Prior research demonstrates that certain identities are more salient than others. While most
identities are malleable, those that contribute to a person’s conception of self are less so. The
two most fundamental categories of identity are primary identities, which are established early in
life, and interactive identities, which are formed by relationships with others (Jenkins, 2014, 41–
48).3 A person’s primary identity includes their conception of gender, early kinship, and ethnicity.
Since individuals identify themselves in relation to others, there are also important fundamental
identities that arise later in life, including one’s socio-economic status, career, and adult family
life. Categorization of the self based on these fundamental identities allows for the recognition
of similar others, even when there is not a pre-existing personal relationship (Jenkins, 2014, 110–
111).
There is precedent for considering the role of leader identities in international relations. In
his study of transnational security communities, Cronin (1999, 18) argues that “identities pro-
vide a frame of reference from which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their
relationships with other states.” Even Morgenthau (1973, 235), who is known primarily for his
contributions to realism, has pointed to the importance of identity, arguing that leaders in the 17th
and 18th century trusted each other in large part because of a shared social identity: leaders across
different countries “were joined together by family ties, a common language (French), common
2See also Wendt (1999), for a discussion of social identity.
3Jenkins (2014) also discusses a third major category of identity based on the interaction between individuals and
institutions. While not the focus of this paper, understanding institutionalized identities is important for thinking
about how shared participation in formal organizations can lead to the transformation of relationships based on shared
understandings.
30
cultural values, a common style of life, and common moral convictions about what another gentle-
man was and was not allowed to do . . . ”. In the policy world as well there is emphasis on leader
backgrounds: the US government has historically made reports about foreign leadership based on
personality profiles and characteristics (Krasno, 2015, 12). These reports on foreign leaders as
well as open source reporting allow for leaders to gain information about others’ identities and
backgrounds.
Though it is true that political leaders are likely different from average citizens, leaders are not
exempt from having conceptions of their own identity and from observing and making judgments
about the identities of others. As Wundt (1998/1897, 92), one of the founders of modern psychol-
ogy wrote in 1897, people (even leaders) are “never in a state entirely free from feeling.” Leaders
themselves reference their own humanity. Anatoly Chernyaev, one of Mikhail Gorbachev’s closest
advisers, recalled that after returning from a Washington D.C. summit in 1987, Gorbachev ad-
dressed the Politburo by remarking “how much the human factor means in international politics
. . . it turns out that politicians, including leaders of governments if they are really responsible peo-
ple, represent purely human concerns, interests, and the hope of ordinary people . . . In our age,
it turns out, this has the biggest impact on political decisions” (Booth and Wheeler, 2008, 156,
emphasis added).
2.1.1 Theories and Evidence from Social Psychology
To see how identity can lead to cooperation, it is helpful to first think through frameworks in
other disciplines. In sociology, the paradigmatic theory that explains why individuals consistently
prefer members of their own self-identified group to others is Social Identity Theory (SIT). Tajfel
(1978) argues that individuals categorize identities to systemize and simplify their environment.
During categorization, people make value judgments about others, especially when the identities
are important to the individual. Moreover, value differentiation tends to increase perceived dif-
ferences (Tajfel, 1978, 62). The unconscious categorization of others’ identities leads to the per-
ception of difference between the self and others when identities are disparate, and discrimination
against others may be magnified by the subconscious desire to feel good about one’s own group or
31
identity. This argument is supported by Wilson and Eckel (2010, 12), who argue that “stereotyping
is the result of a natural human tendency to categorize, and often operates as a heuristic shortcut.”
As Chapter 1 made clear, evidence abounds in support of SIT in sociology and psychology. As
early as 1906 sociologist William Sumner argued that “the insiders in a we-group are in a relation
of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or
others-groups, is one of war and plunder . . . . Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and
contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without – all grow together” (Sumner,
1906, 12). More recent evidence also suggests that people trust those to whom they are similar. In
the United States for example, surveys indicate people are more likely to trust their family, fellow
Americans, neighbors, and those who attend the same church or club (Uslaner, 2002, 19–30).
Likewise, experiments show that trust decreases as social distance increases (Buchan, Croson, and
Dawes, 2002).
Shared identity and trust are linked in this research, since the mere establishment of a group
or a sense of shared identity can lead to in-group favoritism (see for example Tyler and Dawes,
1998; Dawes, Van de Kragt, and Orbell, 1988). In other words, “simply knowing that an otherwise
unknown person is a member of a salient in-group may be sufficient to engender trust as a default
assumption” (Maddux and Brewer, 2005, 161, and see also Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna (1996)).
Linkage occurs because actors internalize the identities that are important to them, then relate to
others with the same identities as part of an “us”, meaning “those whom we trust, toward whom
we are okay, and for whose problems we care in the spirit of solidarity” (Sztompka, 1999, 5).
Trust arises because actors see something in another that binds them together (Uslaner, 2002, 18),
decreasing the risk of trusting (Wilson and Eckel, 2010; Bohnet, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser, 2008;
Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). Indeed, Macy and Skvoretz (1998, 651) go so far as to argue that
“the earliest trust rule is based on social distance – trust neighbors, but not outsiders” (see also
Ellison, 1993).
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2.1.2 Theories and Evidence from Social Neuroscience
Theories and evidence from neuroscience suggest that people act on mental shortcuts or heuris-
tics in everyday life to simplify and accelerate decision-making. One such complex decision is who
to trust and when. Todorov, Pakrashi, and Oosterhof (2009) for example show that people automat-
ically make judgments about the trustworthiness of others based on facial appearances, such that
“personal impressions are often formed rapidly and spontaneously from minimal information.” In-
group status, or the recognition of similar identities is one such mental shortcut used to establish
trust in another. There is evidence that the brain makes a judgment about how trustworthy someone
is in as little as 100 milliseconds based on characteristics of others (Engell, Haxby, and Todorov,
2007, 1515). Not only does the brain make a nearly instantaneous judgment, but when someone
senses that another is untrustworthy, the amygdala, or the brain’s fear center, is activated to produce
an emotional response. Observable, knowable characteristics then are a source of information that
allows for a mental shortcut to judge the trustworthiness of others.
Since it is impossible to have complete information about the thoughts, beliefs, and inten-
tions of others, leaders need to consider how to make assessments about what are likely to be the
true preferences and intentions of other actors. Evidence from social psychology and social neu-
roscience indicates that when two actors share similar identities, it is easier to understand what
another’s position might be, easier to empathize, and easier to see how another views the world.4
Empathy is key for assessing the trustworthiness of others; the more identities leaders share the
more they are able to view a situation from another person’s perspective and understand how they
might think and feel, providing much-needed information to help judge whether the other should
be trusted.
2.1.3 Trust, Identity, and Cooperation
The discussion thus far makes clear that in addition to identity, the concept of trust is important
to understand. While there are countless definitions of trust in political science as well as in
4It is necessary to note that I distinguish between empathy and sympathy. The former involves the ability to put
oneself in the shoes of the other, and does not necessarily involve a positive emotional response.
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other fields, including in sociology, business management, and psychology, most definitions tend
to share two commonalities, as Chapter 1 elucidates (e.g. Rathbun, 2011; Ruzicka and Wheeler,
2010; Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Hardin, 2006; Kydd, 2005). First, trust involves believing that
another will behave benevolently towards the self in the future (Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao, 2010;
Hardin, 2006; Larson, 1997b). Second, trust requires a willingness to accept vulnerability, or to
put oneself at risk. Indeed, trust only occurs in environments of risk, since without risk trust would
not be necessary (see Hardin (2006, 28) and Wheeler (2009, 437)). Actors accept risk because they
believe that the probability of negative consequences is sufficiently low. The willingness to accept
risk is intimately tied to judgments about the benevolent intentions of other actors. Individuals
choose to place their fate partially in the hands of another actor based on the expectation that the
other will cause no harm (Rathbun, 2011; Hoffman, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998).
Believing in the benevolent intentions of other actors and a willingness to accept risk can be
seen in most definitions of trust, both within political science and in other fields (e.g. Wheeler,
2018; Borum, 2010; Adler and Barnett, 1998). For the sake of this chapter, trust is defined as “a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations
of the intentions or behavior of another,” and equivalently, Believing, despite uncertainty, that
another will not act in a way that hurts me (Rousseau et al., 1998, 395). Knowing whether to
trust another in the political context provides crucial information that makes cooperation on a
wide variety of issues easier. Everything from terminating rivalries to believing an ally will honor
its commitment to an alliance is easier when leaders trust each other. In the nuclear context,
for example, it is well-known that since states can get around most verification systems, crafting
effective protocols depends on the degree to which states trust each other not to cheat (see Larson,
1997a, 706).
Even political leaders have recognized the importance of trust: During the Cold War, Ronald
Reagan told Mikhail Gorbachev that if their two nations could learn to trust one another, “then
those mountains of weapons will disappear quickly as we will be confident that they are not
needed” (quoted in Yarhi-Milo, 2014, 196). General Secretary Gorbachev subscribed to this be-
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lief as well, noting that “many difficult issues are far more easily and quickly resolved if there is
trust between political leaders, without unnecessary diplomatic moves and formalities” (quoted in
Forsberg, 1999, 617-618).
Based on investigations of trust and identity in other fields, individuals determine the intentions
and trustworthiness of others based at least in part on identity. In other words, identities are heuris-
tic shortcuts used to form opinions about the trustworthiness of others. People gauge whether or
not to trust based at least in part based on the embeddedness of social identities, or how many so-
cial identities are shared. Trust is easier when individuals have a high degree of embedded identity,
meaning a high degree of social closeness. The more social identities two people share, the more
points there are on which to form a connection with another, making it more likely to lead to a
feeling of trust, which makes it simpler and cheaper to cooperate with another.




Intuitively, it is easy to understand that if you trust someone you are more likely to believe
what they say and feel that they mean you no harm. But how exactly is this belief and confidence
in the benevolence of another created? Social identities provide information that help leaders to
understand the preferences, intentions, emotions, and world view of other leaders. Leaders with
more similar social identities have more points on which to try to understand the other. With more
similarities, there are more opportunities to understand and empathize with others.
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2.2 Identity and Trust in Nuclear Cooperation
Civilian nuclear cooperation, defined as the “state-authorized transfer of nuclear facilities, tech-
nology, materials, or know-how from one country to another for peaceful purposes” is a prototyp-
ical example for the potentially catastrophic effects of cooperation in world politics (Fuhrmann,
2009, 193). When a leader signs a nuclear cooperation agreement, she agrees to provide nuclear
materials and assistance for civilian purposes, such as generating electricity at nuclear power plants
or for researching medical isotopes. However, because all nuclear technology is dual-use in nature,
a recipient country can also use this aid to build nuclear weapons in the future.
To demonstrate the potential pitfalls of civilian nuclear cooperation, consider the case of Cana-
dian assistance to India. In 1956 Canada and India signed the CIRUS (Canada India Reactor Utility
Services) deal for a 40 MW research reactor. The deal marked the beginning of 18 years of nuclear
cooperation in which Canada provided nuclear assistance to India under the condition that all as-
sistance would be used for explicitly peaceful purposes. Three years after the CIRUS reactor went
critical in 1960, Canada and India agreed to a second deal to build the 100 MW Rajasthan Atomic
Power Plant (RAPP-1). The deal allowed for the transfer of materials and knowledge to build the
facility, as well as uranium to fuel the power plant. Additional Canadian assistance was provided
on the larger RAPP-2 project three years later. Despite promising peaceful intentions and submit-
ting to safeguards and verification, India carried out what it called a “peaceful” nuclear explosion
(PNE) on May 18, 1974. India was able to build nuclear weapons because of the Canadian transfer
of knowledge, expertise, and materials (see Fuhrmann, 2012). In particular, the CIRUS reactor
provided by Canada gave India the means to produce the weapons grade plutonium that was used
in India’s PNE, and the repeated exchanges contributed to increased knowledge and training for
Indian scientists.
This example demonstrates the high risks involved in engaging in nuclear cooperation. Since
it is impossible to have complete information about the thoughts and intentions of others, leaders
considering whether to provide nuclear assistance need to determine whether a partner can be
trusted to keep their word to use civilian nuclear assistance solely for peaceful purposes. Evidence
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from social psychology and social neuroscience indicates that when two actors share more similar
identities, it is easier to understand what another’s position might be, easier to empathize, and
easier to see how another views the world.
Therefore, I expect countries with more similar leaders in terms of identity to be trusted more
with nuclear technology compared to leaders with dissimilar identities.
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, leaders with more similar identities are more likely to sign nuclear
cooperation agreements.
Even when two individuals trust each other, the position of the leader within her own gov-
ernment must also be considered. Leaders vary in the degree to which they have the capability
to execute their wishes without constraint (Jervis, 2013). Some leaders, particularly leaders with
little bureaucratic oversight, may be more able to execute their preferences without meddling from
individuals or institutions within their own government. In other words, the capability of leaders to
carry out what they promise to do must also be considered.5 Leaders are often entrenched in com-
plex bureaucracies with multiple veto-players responsible for ultimate policy decisions, meaning
that a recipient leader’s trustworthiness alone may not be enough to convince a supplier country to
provide risky technology.
Suppose for example leader B and leader C are equally trustworthy. In other words, leader
A believes both leaders’ promises to refrain from using dual-use nuclear technology for illicit
purposes. Leader B is more institutionally constrained than leader C, meaning there are more veto
players with influence over domestic policy decisions. While both B and C are trusted equally,
leader A may be more likely to supply leader C with nuclear technology because in addition to
believing she can be trusted, her commitment to do as promised is more credible because there are
fewer domestic actors able influence policy outcomes.6
In 1985 for example Argentine President Alfonsín proposed the negotiation of a bilateral sys-
5Wheeler (2018) makes a similar distinction by talking about the differences between trust and confidence. See as
well my discussion of trust and capability in Chapter 1.
6See Appendix A for further discussion of why I focus on the recipient leader’s constraint rather than on the
supplier’s constraint.
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tem for control of nuclear materials. While these two leaders would later cooperate on nuclear
issues, at the time, Brazilian President Sarney was not able to negotiate on the proposal because
of strong opposition by the military, and because as a military-appointed civilian president, Sarney
“lacked the legitimacy, or indeed the will, to exert presidential control over the Brazilian nuclear
program” (Wrobel and Redick, 1998, 170). Leaders themselves are aware of their relative ability
to carry out their own preferences. In 1988, after 29 largely unfettered years in office, Former Pres-
ident of Côte d’Ivoire Félix Houphouët-Boigny, said: “there is no number two, three, or four . . . In
Côte d’Ivoire there is only a number one: that’s me and I don’t share my decisions” (Meredith,
2011). Therefore, I expect:
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, leaders with more similar identities are more likely to sign nuclear
cooperation agreements when there are fewer institutional constraints on recipient leader decision-
making.
2.3 Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
The prior section makes clear that cooperation on nuclear issues carries some of the highest risk
and greatest potential for harm compared to other forms of cooperation in world politics. While
nuclear cooperation takes place for peaceful purposes, recipient countries can easily turn assistance
towards nefarious ends. Many forms of nuclear assistance, including technology, facilities, and
knowledge are dual-use in nature, meaning they can be used for both civilian and military purposes.
Practically, this means that assistance provided for ostensibly civilian purposes can also be used to
make the deadliest weapon known to man. Identifying the leaders who can be trusted to keep their
promise to refrain from using nuclear assistance for military purposes is crucial. If shared identity
matters in the nuclear context, where strategic considerations are known to be paramount, then it
is likely that identity matters in other security contexts as well.7
My dependent variable, NCA, is the signing of a nuclear cooperation agreement in a particular
year (Fuhrmann, 2009). Nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA’s) are a prominent and observable
7I am not the only scholar focused on the link between trust and nuclear issues. Most recently Mehta, Mattiacci,
and Whitlark (2018) examine the relationship between trust and nuclear latency and Bowen et al. (2018) focus on the
role of trust in nuclear disarmament verification.
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form of nuclear cooperation, making them well-suited for assessing the role of identity on coop-
eration in my empirical analysis. NCA’s cover any material, technology, or knowledge that would
allow a country to develop, run, or expand a civilian nuclear program. NCA’s may include different
categories of assistance including nuclear reactors, nuclear materials, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear
safety, and intangible goods. In the analysis below I omit cooperation agreements that include only
provisions for nuclear safety, because these agreements do not provide for the transfer of materials
or knowledge that could lead to problematic dual-use activity. I also omit NCA’s signed for dis-
tinctly military purposes. Military NCA’s fall outside the bounds of my theory because they are not
for purely civilian purposes, and therefore the concern that a country could illicitly use assistance
for military purposes no longer applies.8
My unit of analysis is the leader-dyad, meaning I include all pairs of leaders in the period from
1950-2002. The primary independent variable is shared identity between leaders. Every person
carries with them a multitude of identities, which may matter to different extents depending on
context. While it is impossible to know precisely which social identities will be paramount for
a leader at any given time, there are a set of fundamental identities that are both strong enough
for a leader to be defined by regardless of context, and are visible or knowable to others (Jenkins,
2014). These major identities are formative, in that they help to shape how an individual views
herself, defines herself in relation to others, and places herself in relation to the rest of the world.
When leaders share a greater number of these formative identities they are more able to relate
to the other, can more easily empathize, and are less likely to see the other as threatening. The
major social identities below are based on Jenkins (2014), and are important for allowing leaders
to identify with and trust one another. Unless otherwise noted, the leader identity variables are
from the LEAD dataset (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam, 2015).
• SHARED EARLY LIFE EXPERIENCES: Early life experiences, especially shared early kinship,
is a key identity (Jenkins, 2014). Individuals who grew up with both parents present may
be more likely to trust in general, and may also find it easier to trust other similar people
8When I include nuclear safety agreements and military NCA’s the findings are similar.
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(Uslaner, 2002, 92). In the analysis that follows, leaders are coded as having a shared early
life experience if they shared the same number of parents growing up, were both orphans, or
both illegitimate.
• SHARED GENDER: Jenkins (2014) argues that gender is one of the most important formative
identities, since individuals carry their conception of their own gender with them throughout
their life (see also Krause, 1996). Studies in political science have also shown the importance
of accounting for gender when considering the role of leaders in international politics (e.g.
Barnes and O’Brien, 2018; Lu and Breuning, 2014; Koch and Fulton, 2011).9
• SHARED SOCIAL STATUS: Leaders who share a similar perceived social status may identify
with one another more compared to leaders from different social groups (Jenkins, 2014).
Mao Zedong for example reportedly looked down on Nikita Khrushchev for being less edu-
cated. Mao notably tried to humiliate Khrushchev during a state visit by insisting they swim
– giving Khrushchev giant arm floaties to wear in the pool and swimming laps around him –
knowing Khrushchev had never been in a position as a child to learn (Dash, 2012). Leaders’
socio-economic status, wealth, and degree of education allows for identification as part of a
similar group (see also Bellemere and Kroger, 2007; Gachter, Herrmann, and Thoni, 2004).
In the analysis that follows leaders are coded as having a shared social status if they shared
a similar socio-economic background, wealth, or level of education.
• SHARED ADULT IDENTITIES: A leader’s adult life likely influences their ability to identify
with others (Jenkins, 2014). There is evidence for example, that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail
Gorbachev identified with each other as family men (Wheeler, 2018, 155). Shared adult
identities is coded 1 if both leaders were married during their time in power or had children.
• SHARED MILITARY BACKGROUND: While an individual’s career or vocation could be a
potentially important identity, both Deaux et al. (1995, 285) and Jenkins (2014) suggest it
9The historical scarcity of women leaders means jointly male dyads dominate the data. Only 0.06% of leader dyads
are jointly female and 5.4% of leader dyads are mixed-gender. When shared gender is omitted from the analysis the
results are consistent.
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may be less definitive for a person’s self-conception compared to other factors like gender
and kinship. Vocations are likely to change throughout life, and depending on the career, may
not be crucial to a leader’s self conception, especially once she takes office and becomes a
politician. Certain careers however, are more likely to form a lasting impact and be crucial
to an individual’s identity. Previous work by Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015), Horowitz and
Stam (2014), and Colgan and Lucas (2016) demonstrates that participation in the military
or a rebel movement can impact leader decision-making while in office. Shared military
background is coded 1 if both leaders participated in the military or in a rebel movement,
and 0 otherwise.
My theory predicts that leaders with more similar social identities are better able to cooperate
on issues in world politics. The primary independent variable, IDENTITY SCORE, is a count of the
total number of shared identities ranging from zero to five, based on the typology above.10 This
variable captures the degree of shared identity, or how embedded the identities of the two leaders
are.11 While gender, shared early life experiences, socio-economic status, military background,
and adult family life are not the only identities that can lead to trust, they are easily observable
or knowable by other leaders and have been shown in both previous literature and in historical
relationships to influence perceptions between individuals. Other major formative identities like
ethnicity and ideology are discussed and accounted for shortly.
2.3.1 Bureaucratic Constraints
Domestic POLITICAL CONSTRAINT is measured based on whether a change in one actor’s
preferences leads to changes to government policy. Henisz (2002, 2017 update) derives a quanti-
tative measure of institutional constraint using a spatial model of political interaction based on the
number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change in each coun-
10The inspiration for creating this scale of shared identities comes from Cronin (1999), who conceptualizes the
measurement of identity on a scale from negative to positive, ranging from hostility, rivalry, indifference, cohesion,
altruism, and symbiosis.
11Deschamps and Doise (1978) have shown that when there is partial identification across categories, or cross-
cutting identification, group differentiation is smaller, meaning that with increased identification, individuals are more
likely to view another person as similar to the self (see also Turner, 1978).
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try.12 The initial measure is altered to take into account the extent of alignment across branches of
government and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each branch. Possible scores for the
final measure of political constraint range from zero (least constrained) to one (most constrained),
though in the estimation sample the highest level of political constraint in recipient countries is
0.719.
2.3.2 Strategic Considerations
Shared preferences are captured through common enemies, shared alliances, and dyadic con-
flict. Sharing an enemy and an alliance are two of the most important strategic reasons for why
a leader might have shared interests and choose to cooperate in regards to nuclear matters, while
dyadic conflict is expected to decrease cooperation. These three factors are used by previous schol-
ars to test the strategic incentives for nuclear cooperation (e.g. Fuhrmann, 2009). SHARED RIVAL
is coded 1 if two states share a rival in a particular year and 0 otherwise. SHARED ALLIANCE is
coded 1 if two states share a defense alliance in year t and 0 otherwise. DYADIC CONFLICT is
coded 1 if two states are engaged in a conflict with each other in year t, and 0 otherwise.
The goal of my statistical analysis is to assess whether shared identity is associated with nuclear
cooperation after controlling for strategic factors that are salient in to prior studies. My theory
expects that even while controlling for strategic reasons for cooperation, identity variables make
cooperation more likely.13 In addition to including rivalry, alliances, and conflict in my primary
model, I also limit the sample based on known strategic factors, by looking only at cases in which
there is either a shared defense pact or a shared rival. Limiting the sample in this way allows me
to hold constant strategic factors known to increase the likelihood of cooperation and demonstrate
that shared identity still influences cooperation in these contexts.
12Including executive, lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary and sub-federal institutions. See also the
POLCONIII Codebook. See Appendix A for more details on this variable.
13The strategic variables come from Fuhrmann (2009)’s analysis of strategic nuclear cooperation.
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2.3.3 Potential Confounding Variables
What might influence both whether a NCA is signed, and whether a leader with a particular
identity is likely to come into office in a particular country? Identities are not assigned randomly
to individuals in different countries, and leaders are not randomly selected for office. If factors that
influence the likelihood of a leader with a particular identity coming into office also influence the
likelihood of a certain country engaging in nuclear cooperation, inference will be more difficult.
If certain types of governments are more likely to engage in nuclear cooperation agreements
and also more likely to elect leaders with particular identities, then it is necessary to include regime
type as a potential confounding variable. A substantial literature links regime type, and in particular
democracy, to trust and cooperation. Larson (1997b, 713) for example argues that authoritarian
states are distrusted because of their motives while democratic states are distrusted because of
their resolution. Others point to democracies and democratic leaders as being more trustworthy
and more trusting, in part because democracies have a more benign view of human nature (e.g.
Rathbun, 2009; Owen, 1994; Doyle, 1986).14 To control for regime type in my primary model, I
include an indicator of whether or not two states are both democracies, JOINT DEMOCRACY.15
How wealthy a country is could also influence both the type of leader to come into office and
whether certain countries are more likely to engage in nuclear cooperation. Countries with greater
national wealth or economic development may tend to be led by individuals with different identities
compared to countries with less wealth or development. The level of economic development in a
country may also influence how likely a nuclear supplier is to provide nuclear assistance. To
address this concern I include the per capita real GDP of both the supplier and the recipient country
in constant 1996 dollars (Fuhrmann, 2009).
To control for possible temporal dependence, I include a variable that measures the number
of years since a previous NCA was signed, as well as the squared and cubic terms of the variable
in TIME, TIME2, and TIME3 (Carter and Signorino, 2010). The results of my primary model and
14See also Uslaner (2002, Chapter 8) for evidence of higher levels of generalized trust in democracies.
15This measure comes from Fuhrmann (2009) and is coded 1 if both states score a six or higher on the Polity IV
scale (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2009).
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additional robustness checks including country fixed effects, time lags, and decade controls are
discussed in the following section.16
2.3.4 Results and Discussion
The results of my primary logit model with standard errors clustered by country dyad are shown
in Figure 2.2.17 This model includes a single indicator of shared identity, IDENTITY SCORE, which
measures the total number of shared identities, ranging from zero to five. The coefficient is positive
and statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level, indicating that nuclear cooperation is more likely
when leaders share more similar social identities, even while holding strategic considerations, like
alliances, rivalry, and conflict constant. Each of the strategic predictors for nuclear cooperation
are in the expected direction: sharing an alliance or a rival makes nuclear cooperation more likely,
while being in a dyadic conflict with another state makes cooperation less likely, though this result
is not significant.
It is also important to think about how substantively important shared identity is for influencing
the probability of nuclear cooperation. Figure 2.3 demonstrates that when leaders share a greater
number of social identities they are more likely to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement, based on
the estimates from Model 1.18 The more social identities leaders share, measured by the IDENTITY
SCORE variable, the more likely leaders are to cooperate on nuclear issues.
At first glance, the probabilities in Figure 2.3 appear to be relatively small: Leaders who share
no social identities have a probability score of about 0.002 while leaders who share the highest
number of social identities have a probability score of about 0.006. The low value of these proba-
bilities is due to the rarity of nuclear cooperation agreements in general. The baseline probability
of signing a nuclear cooperation agreement is small to begin with. Increasing the number of shared
identities from zero to five increases the probability of nuclear cooperation by about 0.0045. As
a time-series cross-sectional dataset, the reported probabilities are based on leader-dyad years,
16I also control for distance between countries, trade flows and exports, and country affinity in additional models
(See Appendix A).
17All variables are lagged by one year unless otherwise noted. Full results available in Appendix A.
18I hold continuous and dichotomous variables constant at their mean and modal values, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Logit coefficient plot of Model 1 (N = 141, 025).
meaning the effects will accumulate and become larger over time.
To assess Hypothesis 2, I examine the interaction of POLITICAL CONSTRAINT and IDENTITY
SCORE. Figure 2.4 shows the average marginal effect and 95% confidence intervals of shared iden-
tity across different values of political constraint based on Model 2, which adds an interaction term
to Model 1.19 As political constraint increases, the effect of shared identity on nuclear cooperation
decreases. Indeed, at the highest levels of political constraint (0.6-0.7), there is no statistical sup-
port for Hypothesis 1. The marginal effects of nuclear cooperation at the highest values of political
constraint (at both 0.6 and 0.7 on the constraint index) are statistically different from the marginal
effect at 0 at the 0.05 level.20
19Full results available in Appendix A.
20Calculated using a difference of means test.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted probability of nuclear cooperation, Model 1 (N = 141, 025).
Figure 2.4: Average marginal effects of identity score (Model 2), 95% confidence intervals.
46
2.3.4.1 Addressing Potential Objections
There are two possible objections to my theory and findings: the model specification and the
types of social identities examined in my primary model. I address each of these concerns in the
additional models in Table 2.1 and in Appendix A. Model 3 is the same as my primary model,
estimated in a limited sample in which countries have either a shared rival or a common defense
pact. Examining dyads in which nuclear cooperation is already expected allows me to consider the
role of identity when strategic conditions are held constant. Model 4 utilizes a five year lag of the
predictors instead of a one year lag.21 The coefficients on IDENTITY SCORE in Models 3 and 4
are both positive and statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level, indicating that shared identity
leads to a higher likelihood of nuclear cooperation, even while controlling for strategic factors.
The objective of my analysis is to test if the relationship between individual political leaders
influences whether their countries are more likely to engage in nuclear cooperation, while account-
ing for strategic factors already known to effect cooperation, and for observable confounders such
as regime type. Some confounders however may be unobservable, meaning it is impossible to
control for them directly. One way to address this is to use country dyadic fixed effects as I do in
Model 5, which leads to consistent findings, with IDENTITY SCORE being positive and statistically
significant. The inclusion of decade dummies in addition to country dyadic fixed effects in Model
6 also leads to consistent results.
While Models 5 and 6 are able to account for unobservable, country- and time-specific con-
founders, they do so at the cost of roughly 81% of the observations being lost.22 The reduction in
sample size occurs because any groups with zero within-group variance (meaning any countries
with no history of nuclear cooperation) are dropped from the sample. A Hausman test indicates
random effects (RE) would be inconsistent, so I turn to a Mundlak specification in Model 8 to ac-
21Time lags, or the time it takes for people to form opinions about and act on trustworthiness, may matter a lot
(Larson, 1997b, 724–726). This might be both because it takes time to recognize similar identities in others, especially
when there are limited shared identities on which to connect, and because engaging in substantive cooperation may
require coordination on the part of both parties, which can take time.
22The estimation of a fixed effects linear probability model results in fewer lost observations and similar results with
support for my primary hypothesis (see Table A.3 in Appendix A for full results).
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Table 2.1: Additional analysis of nuclear cooperation agreements.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Limited 5 Year Country Country & Ideology Mundlak
Sample Lag FE Time FE Included Model
IDENTITY SCORE 0.236∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.054) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.000)
IDENTITY SCORE (6) 0.206∗∗∗
(0.042)
CONSTRAINT -0.138 1.092∗∗∗ -0.750∗∗ -0.788∗∗ 0.601∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.331) (0.196) (0.257) (0.258) (0.224) (0.002)
SHARED ALLIANCE 1.379∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.225) (0.225) (0.101) (0.004)
SHARED RIVAL 0.782∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗ -0.368∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.002)
DYADIC CONFLICT -1.558 0.423 -1.324+ -1.355+ -0.938 -0.012∗
(0.962) (0.421) (0.745) (0.748) (0.965) (0.005)
JOINT DEMOCRACY 0.708∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.157 0.203+ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.0922) (0.104) (0.106) (0.094) (0.001)
RGDP1 0.000 -0.000+ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RGDP2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TIME -0.134∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ 0.023 0.017 -0.120∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.000)
TIME2 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
TIME3 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CONSTANT -3.888∗∗∗ -5.367∗∗∗ -5.278∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.169) (0.187) (0.005)
Observations 15632 131115 26677 26677 82934 141025
Standard errors in parentheses.
Decade dummies in Model 6 omitted for space.
Mean values in Model 8 omitted for space.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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count for possible unobservable confounders without the drop in sample size (Mundlak, 1978).23
The Mundlak transformation adds one additional term to the model for each time-varying covari-
ate to account for the between effect of that variable. This addition serves as a fix for the problem
of correlation between the variables and residuals (Bell, 2015; Perales, 2015). The results from
Model 8 are consistent and indicate that nuclear cooperation is more likely when leaders share
more similar identities.24
An easy critique of my argument and findings is that I do not account for the correct identities,
or that I fail to include some important social identities in my analysis. While it is surely the case
that certain identities matter more depending on context, I argue based on prior scholarship that
some identities are more fundamental to who a person is and how they relate to others in general.
These formative identities, which include things like gender and social status, are likely to shape
the way a person sees the world and views others, and to be salient regardless of context. My
theory does not make the case that any one of these identities is likely to be more important than
the other – rather, the more major identities leaders share, the easier it is to identify with and trust
the other, and the more likely leaders are to cooperate with each other.
The five identities discussed and modeled in the prior section are not an exhaustive set of a
person’s fundamental identities. In particular, shared ideology, or whether leaders are more con-
servative or liberal, and shared ethnic background are likely to contribute to positive identifica-
tion.25 A weakness of this analysis is my inability to examine ethnicity in particular, due to data
limitations.26 I am however able to take a first cut at accounting for leader ideology, which I do in
Model 7 in Table 2.1.
SHARED IDEOLOGY between leaders is coded based on the party orientation of the chief exec-
utive’s political party based on data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck
23RE allow for both a universal constant and a unit-specific intercept drawn from a probability distribution estimated
from the data. RE produces efficient estimates even when there is lower sample-to-sample variability, but can be biased
if there is correlation between the unit-specific effects and the variables.
24I also examine a rare events logit model and look only at the first instance of a NCA being signed in a dyad in
Appendix A.
25I use the word ethnicity here to broadly refer to a leader’s language, race, religion, and culture as well as ethnic
identity.
26For more of a discussion about data limitations and future work, see Chapter 5.
49
et al., 2001), expanded and updated by Brambor and Lindvall (2017). Brambor and Lindvall (2017)
code the ideology of the chief executive in 33 mostly large, Western European or American coun-
tries in the period from 1870–2012, focusing on the ideology of the executive’s party in regards
to economic issues (“Left”, “Center”, or “Right”), and whether the executive had an explicitly
Christian platform or not. While neither of these measures can accurately account for a leader’s
personal ideology, they are a close approximation since in most cases a leader’s ideology at least
broadly matches that of her party. In Model 7 I include whether or not both leaders are members
of a “leftist” political party as a sixth possible identity in the IDENTITY SCORE variable.27 The re-
gional focus of the data leads to over 40% reduction in sample size, and limits the ability to make
inferences about smaller or non-Western countries. Nonetheless, the results from Model 7 indicate
further support for my primary hypothesis.
The above empirical analysis demonstrates that shared identity between leaders contributes to
cooperation on nuclear issues. It is also useful however to consider these results in light of a real-
world example. The rapprochement on nuclear issues between Brazil and Argentina in the second
half of the 20th century helps to illustrate my empirical findings.
2.3.4.2 Rapprochement Between Brazil and Argentina
Prior to rapprochement, Argentina and Brazil had a long history of competition rooted in early
colonial-era rivalries and reinforced through frequent disputes over territory and natural resources
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The rivalry expanded into the nuclear realm as both states
invested in nuclear technology, including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, in an attempt
to become the de facto nuclear leader of South America.
By the 1990’s, the relationship between Argentina and Brazil on nuclear issues was starkly
different. The countries had signed a series of joint declarations on nuclear cooperation, acceded
to the Treaty of Tlatelelco for a nuclear weapon free zone, and established a bi-national inspection
and verification regime under the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nu-
clear Materials (ABACC) and the Quadpartite Agreement with the International Atomic Energy
27Previous literature guides my focus on leftist ideology (Baturo and Gray, 2018).
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Agency (IAEA). Additionally, leaders of both countries visited previously secret and highly clas-
sified nuclear installations of their former rival beginning with a bilateral presidential visit in May
1980 between Brazilian President João Figueiredo and Argentine President Jorge Rafael Videla.28
A key component of the improvement in relations between the two countries was the ability
of Presidents Figueiredo and Videla to identify with each other, and see the other as similar to
himself. Both leaders had similar upbringings: they attended military boarding schools for their
education and were raised by fathers in the military. They were both military men themselves and
rose through the ranks of government before leading. They were both married with families and
of a similar socio-economic level (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam, 2015). In other words, these two
leaders would score 5 out of 5 in terms of my IDENTITY SCORE variable.
On top of this, both leaders identified at least in part as Argentine, with an appreciation for
Argentine culture and society. Diplomats and official state memos indicate a major reason for
rapprochement was Figueiredo’s identification with Argentina, where he lived as a youth (Coutto,
2014, 314). Former diplomat Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, speaking of the change of relations
in 1980, points out: Figueiredo “had an innate sympathy toward Argentina, where he had lived
when he was fifteen with his father who was a political exile in Buenos Aires. So he had an
interesting relationship on the personal level, to say the least . . . I believe that his role was very
important” (Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler, 2012, 79–81). Figueiredo and Videla shared similar
formative identities then, as well as similar interactive identities. This case illustrates how personal
relationships between leaders, and the degree to which individual leaders are able to identify with
each other, contributes to facilitating cooperation on nuclear issues.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I argued that shared identity between leaders makes cooperation on nuclear
issues more likely. I demonstrated this process by engaging in an empirical analysis of nuclear
cooperation agreements, showing that shared identity between leaders contributes to cooperation
28From 1980 to 1991, Brazil and Argentina signed a total of ten joint nuclear cooperation agreements (Kutchesfa-
hani, 2014).
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on nuclear issues, even while controlling for strategic factors known to influence cooperation.
This finding is robust across model specifications, and suggests that understanding the relationship
between leaders is crucial for understanding cooperation in world politics.
Going forward, it will be important to think about the generalizability of this theory. I argue
that identity should influence cooperation broadly in areas related to international security, but
some scholars argue that the role of trust is completely contingent on both context and partner (e.g.
Hardin, 2006; Hoffman, 2002). Future studies can also tackle the question of whether trust in one
issue area can lead to trust in others, as some scholars hypothesize (e.g. Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao,
2010, 11-12). I make strides towards answering this question in Chapters 3 and 4 by examining the
contexts of the credibility of promises under extended deterrence and alliance formation. It would
be useful as well to know whether the same dynamics operate outside of the sphere of international
security, for example in trade negotiations.
While there remain many avenues for future research, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5,
this chapter demonstrates that shared identity between leaders increases cooperation on nuclear
issues, especially in countries with low levels of domestic political constraint on leader decision-
making. This finding lends evidence to the idea that identity matters in international politics: while
accounting for the role of individual leaders is important, understanding leader relationships and
the interaction of leader backgrounds and experiences also contributes to understanding coopera-
tion in world politics. In the next chapter I turn to a related context to test my theory, examining
the likelihood of proliferation for states under extended deterrent guarantees.
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3. THE CREDIBILITY OF ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCES: LEADERS, PROLIFERATION,
AND RESTRAINT
Political actors often make promises, but it is difficult to know whether actors will keep their
promises in the future. These promises can range from making a commitment to defend an ally
should another state attack, to promising to reduce arms stockpiles in the future, or to committing
to the cessation of violence in a civil conflict. The problem with each of these promises is that
they commit a leader to take an action in an uncertain future. In other words, while a leader
might commit to a promise and intend to uphold it in time t, there is no guarantee that in time
t+ 1...t+ n, etc. that the leader will still prefer to uphold the promise.
A defense commitment may be strong when it is signed, but become weak in later years as
priorities change (e.g. Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014; Leeds, 2003; Morrow, 1991). A new threat
may emerge making in undesirable to reduce weapons stockpiles. It may no longer be in the
best interest of a leader or government to continue abiding by a peace treaty. In each of these
circumstances it is possible that a leader truly intended to keep her promise when the commitment
was made. In other words, while leaders may not lie about their willingness to uphold promises,
it is possible that changes in the future may make it such that upholding a promise is no longer
desirable. Regardless, this uncertainty necessarily leads to the question of under what conditions
do leaders believe the promises and commitments of others?
This question is particularly relevant in the context of superpower promises of nuclear protec-
tion to protégé non-nuclear weapon states. Since the 1950’s, the United States and Soviet Union,
now Russia, have extended promises of protection and extended nuclear deterrence to allied states
through formal defense alliances. Through these commitments, the superpowers pledged to extend
their nuclear arsenals to non-nuclear allied states to deter aggression by rivals. The purpose of
these alliances was twofold: protect key allies from shared rivals while also encouraging allied
states to forgo independent nuclear pursuit.
Promises of defense however are only effective to the extent that they are credible and believed
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by two distinct audiences. First, rivals have to believe that the superpower protector would be
willing to sacrifice its own territory and population on behalf of another in order to successfully
deter aggression against a client state. Second, the protégé state has to believe the patron’s promises
of protection in order to be willing to rely on a defense commitment for security, rather than
pursuing a more independent security posture. The patron state then must signal both to potential
enemies, as well as to its protégé, that it is able and willing to provide defense if needed.1 This
commitment should lead to less conflict in the presence of a defense pact, as well as reduced
security self-reliance by a protégé, so long as potential challengers and the protégé believe the
commitment of the patron state.
If nuclear guarantees are not credible, client states may have incentives to pursue an au-
tonomous deterrent capability (see for example Lanoszka, 2018; Gerzhoy, 2015). Academics are
not alone in recognizing this dynamic. Previous leaders have been transparent about how promises
of extended deterrence can allay security fears and limit proliferation ambitions. Talking about
the NATO alliance in 1992 for example, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said, “Why should we
have them [nuclear weapons]? . . . It does not disturb my peace of mind to know that seven hours
of flying time from me the US president has the decision-making power of nuclear weapons to
protect us Germans and that 40 minutes from my home there is a French president who has the
same powers. We must state the facts. We do not need them at all” (Cirincione, 2007, 45).
Leaders also explicitly link nuclear restraint to the continuation of security guarantees. In an
interview with Rovert D. Novak in the Washington Post on June 12, 1975, South Korean President
Park Chung-hee spoke about his concerns of the US pulling out of East Asia after Vietnam, and
argued that South Korea would have to go nuclear if the US nuclear umbrella were weakened or
removed: “We have the capability, but are not developing [nuclear weapons] and are honoring the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If the US nuclear umbrella were to be removed, we would have
to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves” (Choi, 2014).
Fears of abandonment by allies and the related belief in the need for self-sufficiency similarly
1In this chapter, I use the term patron state to signify the more powerful, nuclear-armed state in a defense alliance.
I use the terms protégé and client interchangeably to refer to the less powerful, non-nuclear weapon state.
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contributed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons in some countries. US President Dwight D.
Eisenhower for example described the French as has having “an almost hysterical fear that we and
the British will one day pull out of Western Europe” (Sloan, 2016, 39). The belief in the need
for an independent deterrent, or force de frappe, and fear about possible American and British
abandonment were major contributors to the French nuclear weapon program in the 1950’s and
acquisition in 1960 (see Kohl, 1971; Lieber, 1966). Similarly, the South Korean government con-
sidered developing a nuclear deterrent in the 1970’s in response to US military disengagement
in South Vietnam and in light of President Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine. In 1971, President
Park Chung He spoke with a member of the Blue House senior staff in charge of defense, saying:
“Our national security is vulnerable because of the uncertainty surrounding continued US military
presence on the Korean Peninsula. To become secure and independent, we need to free ourselves
from dependence on US military protection . . . ,” and asking of the staff, “Can we develop nuclear
weapons?” (Hong, 2011, 483).
There is variation through time in the ability of superpowers to convince their allies that the
promise of extended deterrence is credible and sufficient to discourage allied proliferation. The
US for example has offered defense pacts to a number of states, including Britain, France, South
Korea, Japan, and (West) Germany. Of these states, both Britain and France chose to pursue their
own nuclear deterrent while South Korea, Japan, and Germany explored but refrained from ac-
quiring a nuclear option.2 What explains these different pathways, and in particular, under what
conditions do allies find promises of extended deterrence credible enough to refrain from pursuing
an autonomous nuclear weapon capability? While previous authors have suggested a number of
factors that contribute to alliance credibility and ally assurance, I suggest a here-to-date unappreci-
ated factor: specifically, the inherent belief in whether or not a fellow leader will keep their alliance
promises, based on a perception of shared background identity and similarity.
In the following section I delve into more detail on prior arguments explaining proliferation
restraint and extended nuclear deterrence. I then discuss my argument in greater detail, hypoth-
2Though the latter states maintain enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Note as well that even while Britain has
nuclear weapons, it is dependent on the United States for maintenance and support.
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esizing that similarities between leaders can make nuclear guarantees more credible and make
proliferation by client states less likely. I then turn to a discussion of my research design and
an interpretation of my findings. I conclude by summarizing my argument and findings and by
suggesting interesting implications that arise from this chapter.
3.1 Background
Scholars have debated the sources of nuclear restraint for decades, focusing on both supply-
side and demand-side restraints (e.g. Miller, 2018; Hymans, 2011; Rublee, 2009; Cirincione, 2007;
Paul, 2000; Solingen, 1994). A key tool for limiting proliferation, some have argued, is the pro-
vision of a credible security commitment from a nuclear-armed state (see for example: Lanoszka,
2018; Bleek and Lorber, 2014). Under this logic, a formal guarantee of protection from a nuclear-
armed patron state can reduce a client state’s incentives to pursue nuclear weapons by providing a
substitute for an independent nuclear deterrent.3
Possessing nuclear weapons may allow insecure states to deter enemies without fear of reprisal
(Brodie, 1959). Building an autonomous nuclear arsenal however can be both costly and danger-
ous: weapons programs are expensive, require high levels of technical expertise, and can lead to
regional security externalities motivating proliferation by rivals, rifts with allies interested in non-
proliferation, and incentives by adversaries to engage in preemptive military strikes. A nuclear
weapon state can mitigate a protégé’s security concerns by credibly committing to provide protec-
tion, leading to lower incentives for the protégé to pursue nuclear weapons autonomously (see also
Monteiro and Debs, 2014, 16).4
The (in)credibility of extended deterrence has been discussed throughout the nuclear age. In
fact, it is more or less taken for granted that the promise of extended deterrence is less credible than
3The terms nuclear security commitment, nuclear umbrella, extended deterrence (type II deterrence), and defense
alliance with a nuclear armed state are used interchangeably throughout this chapter. A defense alliance is defined
as a written commitment between two or more states intended to formalize a promise of one or more states to come
to the defense of another in the event of aggression. A defense alliance carries with it an implicit extended nuclear
deterrence guarantee if one of the involved countries is known to possess nuclear weapons.
4Note however that some quantitative analyses have found little or no effect of having an allied nuclear superpower
security guarantee and pursuing or acquiring nuclear weapons (e.g. Fuhrmann, 2009; Kroenig, 2009; Gartzke and Jo,
2007; Singh and Way, 2004).
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general deterrence. While formalizing a commitment to protect another, usually as an agreed-upon
defense pact, is thought to make promises more binding, the act of writing down a commitment is
alone not enough to guarantee fulfillment (Morrow, 2000). This is epitomized by German Chancel-
lor Theobald von Bethmann-Holweg’s decision to ignore the treaty preserving Belgian neutrality
in 1914, calling it a mere “scrap of paper” (Otte, 2007). Even in the presence of a formalized treaty
then, client states have reason to worry about abandonment by their allies. Even if a commitment
is written down, the absence of a higher universal enforcement system means patron states are not
obligated to uphold commitments, and can abandon their protégés in the face of threats.
What makes a promise to protect another more or less credible has been the subject of much
debate both within political science literature and in policy communities. States use both ex post
and ex ante costly signals to make their commitments appear more credible (Fearon, 1997). Ex ante
signals include offering conventional military deployments (Lanoszka, 2018), arms sales (Yarhi-
Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016), tactical nuclear deployments (Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014),
and visits and statements from leaders (McManus, 2018; Lebovic and Saunders, 2016), though
there are debates about the efficacy of each of these signals for demonstrating reliability (see Reiter,
2014). The flip side of each of these provisions is that if they are removed or reduced, it can
make a patron’s commitment seem weaker, and lead to fears of abandonment and potential nuclear
exploration in the client state (e.g. Lanoszka, 2018; Gerzhoy, 2015).
The most important ex post signal of commitment is the reputational consequences a patron
state could endure upon abrogating a treaty. The act of writing an alliance down and publicly
declaring a commitment to come to another state’s aid in the event of an attack creates conditions
that could lead to reputational damage should a patron state fail to follow through on its promise
(Narang and LeVeck, 2017; Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014; Crescenzi et al., 2012; Gibler, 2008;
Fearon, 1997). Some scholars argue that certain types of states are more able to make credible
commitments. In particular, democracies are thought by some to be particularly reliable allies
since they may have more respect for international law, have transparent and public review and
ratification of agreements, and have domestic political institutions that help maintain policy con-
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sistency during leadership turnover (e.g. Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009; Leeds, 2003; Gaubatz,
1996, though see also Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004); Lai and Reiter (2000)). Democratic leaders
may also be more susceptible to reputation-based audience costs if they fail to follow through on
their promises.
Other characteristics including geographic proximity (Bak, 2018) and attributes of alliance
treaty design (Johnson, Leeds, and Wu, 2015) may also make extended deterrence more cred-
ible. There are myriad tools then that patron states can use to convey the credibility of their
commitments, and yet new research shows that military alliances are upheld much less often than
conventional wisdom suggests (Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018). If states uphold their military
commitments only 50% of the time, there is significant enough uncertainty for client states to con-
tinue to question their patron’s sincerity, potentially leading to nuclear exploration and acquisition
when security commitments are in doubt.
While previous scholars suggest multiple tools through which leaders can attempt to make their
promises more credible, these analyses do not acknowledge that certain leaders may be inherently
more capable of credibly communicating resolve to uphold a commitment to a client state. In the
next section, I explain the logic of how patron state leaders who are more similar to leaders in
client states are more likely to be seen as credible providers of nuclear guarantees, making client
states less likely to pursue independent nuclear weapon programs.
3.2 Identity and Trust in Extended Deterrent Relationships
The previous section highlights arguments made by scholars suggesting that security guaran-
tees alone are insufficient to guarantee nuclear restraint in protégé states5 Instead, the likelihood
that a defense alliance will moderate a protégé’s proliferation is conditional on the ability of the
patron state to assure the client that the commitment is credible and robust (Lanoszka, 2018). To
date, most literature has focused on the efficacy of particular signaling mechanisms – including
conventional forces, foreign nuclear deployments, visits by leadership, etc. – for demonstrating
the credibility of commitments. While these mechanisms have been shown to contribute to allied
5Some scholars argue that alliances are not particularly effective at restricting proliferation at all (e.g. Reiter, 2014).
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assurance to different extents, I argue that some leaders may be inherently more capable of mak-
ing credible promises to their protégés. In particular, leaders in patron states who share similar
background characteristics with client-state leaders are able to more convincingly promise to be a
reliable ally, making nuclear pursuit by client states less likely.
Whether a protégé believes a patron’s commitment to assist depends in part on how much
it trusts the patron.6 In the context of a defense commitment understood to provide a nuclear
security guarantee, a client state leader must believe that the patron state views the protégé as
worth protecting, and that the patron state leader would be willing to sacrifice her own territory
or citizens to extend nuclear protection on behalf of the client’s territory and citizens. Only when
a nuclear guarantee is believed to be steadfast and unwavering will a protégé be willing to rely
on that guarantee, instead of pursuing autonomous security. When a leader’s promise to extend
deterrence to another state seems less credible, the protégé will have incentives to pursue its own
nuclear development, as has been seen in the case of South Korea, and elsewhere (Choi, 2014;
Hong, 2011).
What makes a promise of extended nuclear deterrence more believable? In other words, under
what conditions would a German leader believe the US willing to sacrifice Boston for Bonn, or
a Bulgarian leader believe the Soviet Union willing to sacrifice St. Petersburg for Sofia? While
patrons can utilize overt signaling methods to try and make their promises appear more credible,
leaders in client states also form perceptions about the reliability and trustworthiness of patron
state leaders based on implicit psychological biases. Just as leaders in supplier countries judge the
trustworthiness of recipient leaders to refrain from using peaceful nuclear assistance for nefarious
purposes based on shared background experiences (see Chapter 2), leaders in protégé states deter-
mine whether a security guarantee from a nuclear superpower is credible based in part on common
background identities with the patron state leader.
A small body of scholarship looks to personal evaluations of leaders to understand behavior.
Hall and Yarhi-Milo (2012) for example argue that leaders use personal impressions from inter-
6See Chapters 1 and 2 for a discussion and definition of trust.
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actions with other leaders as credible indicators of sincerity.7 Personal impressions based on ap-
pearance, expression, behavior, and tone of partners observed during interactions allow for making
subjective judgments about likelihood that a state will behave in a manner consistent with leaders’
statements and promises. In the nuclear proliferation context, Fuhrmann and Horowitz (2015) ar-
gue that certain types of leaders, namely leaders who previously participated in a rebellion against
the state, are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons since former rebels are more risk acceptant,
more likely to distrust others, and more likely to see nuclear weapons as a way to bolster national
independence.
While previous scholars have looked to dyadic interactions between leaders based on personal
impressions formed through meetings or to monadic analyses of leader backgrounds, examining
shared background characteristics between two leaders as a way to explain political phenomena
is novel. And yet, it is not surprising that dyadic understandings between leaders should inform
perceptions of trustworthiness and credibility. Why is this the case?
Actors are more likely to keep their promises when the costs of reneging are large. Prior schol-
ars recognize this, leading to discussions of sunk costs and tying hands (e.g. Fearon, 1995, 1997).
The extant rationalist literature however fails to recognize that non-material, non-reputational costs
can also affect leaders. Lying, backing out of an agreement, or betraying another actor is more emo-
tionally costly when doing so hurts someone a leader empathizes with, trusts, or sees as similar
to the self. These emotional costs cause leaders to prefer to keep their commitments to friends
and in-group members, and other leaders know this because they go through the same process of
empathization.
On top of this, there is, and will always be, insufficient information about the interests of others.
Moreover, actors have incentives to misrepresent information to get better deals for themselves.
Given this reality, how can leaders be confident that another leader will do what they promise? In
other words, how is it possible to know what other leaders think, feel, and want? Intuitively, it is
easy to understand that if you trust someone you are more likely to believe what they say and feel
7For more on the role of interactions and face-to-face diplomacy, see Chapter 5.
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that they mean you no harm. But how exactly is this belief and confidence in the benevolence of
another created?
Social identities provide information that help leaders to understand the preferences, intentions,
emotions, and world view of other leaders. Leaders with more similar social identities have more
points on which to understand the other. With more similarities, there are more opportunities to
build an understanding of another person’s worldview and understand and empathize with others.
Holding the written commitment of the patron to assist constant then, I expect to see variation
in how comfortable the protege is with its protection, depending on the degree of shared identity
between the leaders of each state:
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, leaders protected through a bilateral nuclear umbrella are more
likely to engage in nuclear restraint when they share more similar identities with their patron state
leader.
In other words, leaders in client states who share a bilateral defense agreement with a super-
power guarantor will be less likely to pursue nuclear capabilities when they share more similar
background identities with the superpower leader. When there is greater trust in a patron state
leader to uphold promises of extended nuclear deterrence, the protégé will not feel the need to
invest in it’s own security as much. When it is not as easy to trust a patron, a protégé is more likely
to continue to invest in its own security, since the alliance commitment does not appear credible.
This means that nuclear exploration by client states is more likely when leaders are dissimilar,
since the client state leader will judge the superpower leader protector as less likely to uphold a
prior promise when they are less similar to the self.8
3.3 Research Design
Since I am interested in the bilateral relationship between pairs of leaders, my unit of analysis
is the leader-dyad. My sample includes all leader-pair years in which there is a nuclear security
guarantee from either the US or USSR/Russia to any other state in the period from 1945-2014.9
8For more on my general theory of identity, trust, and cooperation, see Chapter 2.
9In some of the models, the inclusion of key controls limits the sample to the period from 1950-2000.
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Data for defense alliances are from Leeds et al. (2002, version 4.01 updated through 2018).
When nuclear weapon states sign defense pacts with non-nuclear states, they are making explicit
promises of general extended deterrence (Johnson, Leeds, and Wu, 2015). Therefore, I consider
a protégé state to have a security guarantee when it has a formal defense pact with a nuclear
armed ally. In particular, the United States and USSR/Russia are the two countries that have
publicly indicated their intention to provide a nuclear umbrella to allies, and are the only two
countries with nuclear arsenals sufficient to extend deterrence to other states (Bleek and Lorber,
2014, 434; see also Lanoszka (2018)). In the primary analysis I focus on formal, bilateral security
guarantees between the US or USSR/Russia and all other countries. In a secondary analysis I
include multilateral defense pacts as well, provided one of the signatories is either the US or
USSR/Russia.10 The alliances included in the analysis are discussed in Appendix B.11
The outcome of interest is nuclear proliferation. My binary dependent variable measures
whether or not states engage in nuclear activity in a given year. While there are multiple ways
this variable can be measured, I code this variable based on the presence of an operational enrich-
ment or reprocessing (ENR) facility in a given year (Fuhrmann and Tkach, 2015, updated 2019).
ENR activity signals significant interest in nuclear technology, since the acquisition of fissile mate-
rials is the biggest barrier for building nuclear weapons. Indeed, using the presence of operational
ENR facilities as a measure of nuclear interest is a commonly accepted practice (e.g. Mehta and
Whitlark, 2017).12 In a supplemental robustness check, I also utilize Singh and Way (2004)’s up-
dated measure of nuclear activity (Lanoszka, 2018, 12).13 States exit the dataset when they develop
10When examining multilateral defense pacts, I exclude other nuclear states. For example, when looking at the
NATO alliance, I include the relationship between Poland and the US, but not the relationship between France and the
US after France acquired nuclear weapons in 1960.
11In the primary analysis I include all active bilateral defense alliances between the US (after 1945) or USSR (after
1949) and all other countries. In a secondary analysis I include only alliances signed after the patron gets nuclear
weapons (1945 for US, 1949 for USSR). This results in the elimination of 12 bilateral alliances and one multilateral
alliance that were signed prior to nuclear acquisition by the superpowers. See Appendix B for more details on this
coding, Table B.9 for the 13 additional alliances included in the additional models, and Table B.4 for the supplemental
model.
12While scholars generally accept that the largest barrier to building nuclear weapons is the production of fissile
materials, previous authors failed to focus on this hurdle, potentially resulting in an upwardly biased estimate of the
number of states with the capability to build nuclear weapons (Sagan, 2011).
13See Table B.4 in Appendix B.
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nuclear weapons, and the independent variables are lagged by one year to reduce concerns about
reverse causality.
The primary independent variable is shared identity between leaders. Every person carries with
them a multitude of identities based on background characteristics, which may matter to different
extents depending on context. While it is impossible to know precisely which social identities
will be paramount for a leader at any given time, there are a set of fundamental identities that are
both strong enough for a leader to be defined by regardless of context, and are visible or knowable
to others (Jenkins, 2014). These major identities are formative, in that they help to shape how
an individual views herself, defines herself in relation to others, and places herself in relation to
the rest of the world. When leaders share a greater number of these formative identities they are
more able to relate to the other, can more easily empathize, and are less likely to see the other as
threatening. The major social identities below are based on Jenkins (2014), and are important for
allowing leaders to identify with and trust one another. Unless otherwise noted, the leader identity
variables are taken from the LEAD dataset (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam, 2015).14
• SHARED EARLY LIFE EXPERIENCES: Leaders are coded as having a shared early life ex-
perience if they shared the same number of parents growing up, were both orphans, or both
illegitimate.
• SHARED GENDER: Leaders are coded as having a shared gender if they are either both male
or both female.15
• SHARED SOCIAL STATUS: Leaders are coded as having a shared social status if they shared
a similar socio-economic background, wealth, or level of education.
• SHARED ADULT IDENTITIES: Leaders are coded as sharing adult identities if both leaders
were married during their time in power or had children, and 0 otherwise.
14For more details on this coding see Chapter 2.
15As noted in the previous chapter, the historical scarcity of women leaders means jointly male dyads dominate the
data.
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• SHARED MILITARY BACKGROUND: Leaders are coded as sharing a military background if
both leaders participated in the military or if both leaders participated in a rebel movement,
and 0 otherwise.
My theory predicts that leaders in client states are more likely to believe the promises of patron
state leaders with whom they share more similar identities. The primary independent variable,
IDENTITY SCORE, is a count of the total number of shared identities ranging from zero to five,
based on the typology above and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. This variable captures how
likely two leaders are to trust each other, based on the degree of shared identity, or how embedded
the identities of the two leaders are. While gender, shared early life experiences, socio-economic
status, military background, and adult family life are not the only identities that can lead to trust,
they are easily observable or knowable by other leaders and have been shown in both previous
literature and in historical relationships to influence perceptions between individuals.
In the following section I discuss my model choices in greater detail, as well as discussing po-
tential confounding variables before presenting and interpreting the results of my empirical models.
3.4 Discussion and Analysis
The objective of my analysis is to test whether leaders in client states are more likely to believe
promises of extended nuclear deterrence when patron state leaders are more similar, while ac-
counting for potential observable confounders. Some confounders however may be unobservable,
meaning it is impossible to control for them directly. To address this, my primary logit models use
country dyadic fixed effects.16
Since my goal is to understand the relationship between proliferation and the perceived credi-
bility of security guarantees, my primary models include a small number of potentially confound-
ing control variables that could influence both a state’s decision to proliferate and the perceived
credibility of a patron state’s leader to uphold a defense pact. Since the dependent variable of ENR
16In addition to using dyadic fixed effects, I also account for the possible influence of time by including year fixed
effects (see Appendix B). A limitation of fixed effects models is they tend to lead to a drastic reduction in sample size,
since any groups with zero within-group variance are dropped from the sample. In Appendix B I employ a logit model,
rare events logit model, and linear probability model with fixed effects, resulting in similar substantive conclusions.
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operations is relatively rare, I am cautious about over-fitting the model by including a lot of ex-
planatory variables (Achen, 2005). Model 1 includes only the IDENTITY SCORE variable specified
by my theory as likely to influence the probability of nuclear pursuit and a variable measuring the
number of years since the last pursuit of nuclear weapons. This TIME variable, and the squared and
cubic versions of the variable, are included to account for possible temporal dependence (Carter
and Signorino, 2010).17
Model 2 includes an additional two variables which may influence both a leader’s decision to
pursue ENR as well as the type of leader that comes into office. First, wealthier countries have more
financial resources to engage in proliferation, and previous studies have shown that the motivation
and ability to engage in nuclear activity are due at least in part to economic resources (e.g. Meyer,
1984). At the same time, wealthier states may be systemically more likely to elect certain types
of leaders to office. GDP represents the client state’s GDP per capita in a particular year (Miller,
2018). Second, a state’s regime type may influence the likelihood of engaging in nuclear activity
as well as the type of leader that is elected. DEMOCRACY is coded 1 if the client state has a Polity
IV score of six or greater, and 0 otherwise (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2009).18
Model 3 adds an additional four potentially relevant variables to the model: NPT MEMBERSHIP,
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, the TOTAL NUMBER OF NCA’S TO DATE, and a variable capturing a five
year moving average of involvement in militarized interstate disputes (MIDS). Data on NCA’s are
from Fuhrmann (2012). Data on industrial capacity, NPT membership, and MID participation are
from Miller (2018).
Across all three of these primary models, the coefficient on IDENTITY SCORE is negative and
statistically significant, suggesting that the more similar a client state leader is with a patron state
leader, the less likely she is to pursue enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. This means when
two countries share a bilateral defense alliance, the client state is less likely to pursue nuclear
activity when two leaders are more similar. Substantively, this indicates that for states under a
17TIME is coded as the number of years since a state previously had an operational ENR capability. In the models
with alternate measures of pursuit, it is coded as the time since prior pursuit based on Singh and Way (2004).
18Including a measure of shared democracy between the client and patron does not alter the results.
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nuclear umbrella, a unit increase in shared identity reduces the odds of ENR activity by 49%
in Model 1, 76% in Model 2, and 71% in Model 3, holding all else constant. Overall, these
results suggest that when leaders are more similar, there are higher odds of nuclear restraint under
extended deterrence.
Table 3.1: Primary models.
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Key Controls Fully Specified










TOTAL NCA’S TO DATE -0.00955
(0.135)
MIDS: 5 YEAR MOVING AVERAGE -1.284∗
(0.564)
TIME 3.581∗∗∗ 0.383 -1.024
(0.402) (0.481) (0.665)
TIME2 -0.952∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.243∗
(0.127) (0.104) (0.117)
TIME3 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗
(0.00636) (0.00512) (0.00596)
Observations 391 348 346
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
While I argue that leaders in client states who share a bilateral defense agreement with a su-
perpower guarantor will be less likely to pursue nuclear capabilities when they share more similar
identities with a patron state leader, this logic may not hold in multilateral alliances. In multilateral
alliances, the superpower leader simultaneously has to commit to protect multiple countries at the
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same time. Protection through these multilateral agreements may be understood as less binding
than in bilateral agreements, or more contingent on context. As one example of this, there has
been variation though time and across countries in terms of the extent to which European nations
feel protected by NATO (e.g. Smith, 2017). Additionally, since these multilateral defense pacts
usually call for multilateral defense commitments, the client-patron relationship is less clear. In
NATO for example, non-nuclear weapon states could conceivably look to the US, UK, France, or
a combination of all three of these countries as nuclear guarantors.
Indeed, there is a clear difference in the ability of shared leader identity to influence nuclear ac-
tivity in client states when bilateral alliance relationships are compared to all alliance relationships.
Figure 3.1 shows the logit coefficient point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for IDENTITY
SCORE in six different models. The full results for Models 1-3 in the bilateral context are in Table
3.1. The coefficients for Models 1-3 are clearly negative and do not intersect the 0 line, indicating
that nuclear restraint is more likely when a client state leader sees a patron state leader as similar
to herself. These findings support my primary hypothesis that bilateral security guarantees are
more credible when two leaders are similar. What can be said however for defense alliances in
general, meaning both bilateral and multilateral alliances? Models 3-6 replicate Models 1-3 in a
more complete sample of all defense alliances between the US or USSR and other countries. When
multilateral alliances are included in the sample, the logit coefficients of IDENTITY SCORE are not
statistically significant, suggesting that leadership similarity is not able to influence perceptions of
a patron’s credibility or trustworthiness in the multilateral context, as it is able to in the bilateral
context.19
Two critiques of my empirical analysis may have to do with the choice of sample and modeling
strategy. While the prior analysis privileges using a theoretically relevant sample and a robust
modeling strategy, both result in the loss of potentially relevant observations. While the country
dyadic fixed effect approach accounts for potential unobservable confounders, it does so at the loss
of observations because only observations with within-group variance through time are included.
19Full results available in Appendix B.
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Figure 3.1: Logit coefficients of identity score for bilateral (Models 1-3) and all alliances (Models
4-6).
To allay concerns about the small sample size and loss of observations through the fixed effect
logit model specification, I re-run my primary models from Table 3.1 as linear probability models
(LPMs), resulting in a roughly doubled sample size and consistent results. The coefficients on
IDENTITY SCORE are negative and statistically significant (p < 0.001). The complete results from
these models are available in Table B.3 in Appendix B.
In addition to using LPMs as an alternative modeling approach, I also broaden the sample
to include all pairs of leaders regardless of whether there is a defense alliance, provided one of
the leaders represents the US or the USSR/ Russia. I then include an interaction of IDENTITY
SCORE and BILATERAL DEFENSE ALLIANCE. The full results for the interaction models are in
Table B.2 in the Appendix. This method also doubles the sample size, while also allowing for
the consideration of states both with and without bilateral defense agreements. Further, I analyze
LPMs of the interaction models in Table B.3 in the Appendix, resulting in an over six-fold increase
in the sample size.
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The interaction models demonstrate that defense alliances alone tend to increase the likelihood
of a client state pursuing ENR. Shared identity between a patron state leader and a client state
leader may also incrementally increase the likelihood of ENR activity, though these results are not
all statistically significant. Across all four interaction models however, the coefficient on the inter-
action term is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01), and the magnitude of the interaction
is larger than the coefficient of IDENTITY SCORE, supporting the findings of the primary analy-
sis. When states share defense commitments, leaders with more similar identities are less likely to
pursue nuclear technology. In other words, client state leaders tend to rely on their superpower pa-
trons to greater extents for security when they share more similarities with the patron state leader.
By contrast, less similar leaders have a more difficult time believing the promises of superpower
guarantors, leading on average to more nuclear activity in client states when patron state leaders
are dissimilar.
3.4.1 Signals and Credibility
Leaders employ both ex post costly and ex ante signals to make their commitments appear
more credible (Fearon, 1997). Does shared identity contribute to beliefs about the credibility of
commitments, even while accounting for other costly signals that have been previously shown to
influence beliefs about the credibility of extended deterrent promises? Table 3.2 includes eight
models accounting for costly signals that countries use to communicate commitment to an ally.
Models 9-12 capture signals sent from both the US and USSR/Russia. Models 13-16 capture
signals sent from the smaller sample of the US alone, due to data limitations for the predictors.
Model 9 includes the signal of NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS from Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014).
Twenty countries housed foreign deployed nuclear weapons from either the US or USSR in the
period from 1950 to 2000. Details on these deployments are in Appendix B. Model 10 includes
ARMS SALES from either the US or from the USSR to all other countries, since patron states may
use arms transfers as a signal of commitment (Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016). Data on
the transfer of conventional weapons are from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































send profound signals of support either through visits to their allies, or through public rhetoric
voicing support for allies (e.g. McManus, 2018; Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). LEADER VISITS
from either the US or USSR to their client states are from McManus (2018) and capture whether
a US or Soviet leader visited their ally’s territory in the previous year. Model 12 includes each of
these measures simultaneously.
Other actions, including deploying conventional troops, providing military or economic aid,
and giving speeches in support of allies can also send powerful signals of commitment for alliance
relationships. Due to data limitations, Models 13-16 account for these signals in a sample of only
dyads with an American guarantor. Model 13 includes four measures that Miller (2018) claims
may stem proliferation: conventional TROOP DEPLOYMENTS, MILITARY AID, ECONOMIC AID,
and TRADE DEPENDENCE.
In addition to prior studies suggesting that conventional troops can send a signal of support
to client states, leaders dependent on promises of extended deterrence have also indicated the
importance of US troops being deployed to make promises more credible. In an interview with
the Washington Post in 1975, former President Park of South Korea said, ". . . If American ground
troops were removed, the enemy will be inclined to make a miscalculation, and American promises
would carry far less credibility” (Choi, 2014). US conventional TROOP DEPLOYMENTS is coded as
1 if there are 100 or more US troops deployed in a client state in a particular year, and 0 otherwise
(Miller, 2018, and see also Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014)).
MILITARY AID and ECONOMIC AID are likewise from Miller (2018) and depend on whether
the state received military or economic aid from the United States in a particular year. TRADE
DEPENDENCE is coded as whether the US was a major trade partner for the client state.20 While
each of these variables are included individually in Model 13, in Model 14 they are combined
as a single variable measuring a state’s DEPENDENCE on the US. Model 15 accounts for ORAL
SUPPORT from US leaders in speeches about allied countries while Model 16 combines the US-
only signals in one model (McManus, 2018). Across all eight of these models, the coefficient on
20Defined as more than the median in the full sample, or 1.79 percent of the state’s GDP involved in imports from
or exports to the US.
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IDENTITY SCORE is negative and statistically significant, indicating that even while controlling for
observable signals of American support for allies, shared identity between leaders still contributes
to making leaders in client states less likely to pursue nuclear proliferation.21
3.5 Conclusion
Leaders in patron states interested in curtailing potential proliferation by their allies have incen-
tives to make their promises of protection appear as credible as possible. When a protégé believes
a patron’s promise of extended nuclear deterrence, that state will have fewer incentives to pursue
independent proliferation. On the other hand, if there are doubts about a patron’s promise of pro-
tection, protégé states will have incentives to attempt to make themselves secure through other
means, including exploring a nuclear option. While signals of commitment – including stationing
troops or nuclear weapons abroad – may make promises more believable to different extents, per-
ceptions about the reliability and commitment of the patron state leader also influence a protégé’s
assessments about how credible a patron state’s promises are.
An empirical analysis of the relationship between leaders in non nuclear weapon states and
superpower leaders demonstrates that client states are more likely to pursue nuclear activity when
their leader protector is less similar. When a leader in a client state perceives her superpower
counterpart to be more similar to herself, it is easier to trust the patron’s word that a defense pact
will be honored, and easier to believe the credibility of the promise of extended nuclear deterrence.
Under these conditions, leaders in client states will feel more secure, and will be less likely to
pursue independent nuclear weapon programs.
This analysis highlights the importance of understanding how leader-level dynamics contribute
to international politics. In particular, the interaction between two leaders, and understandings
about whether another leader can be trusted to uphold prior promises influence perceptions of
security environments and beliefs about the necessity of self-help security practices. Interestingly,
while there is a clear relationship in the bilateral alliance context indicating that greater similarity
between leaders increases perceptions of reliability, the same can not be said in general. When
21In Model 16, p < 0.102 for IDENTITY SCORE.
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multilateral alliances are included in the analysis, there is no statistically significant relationship
between shared leader backgrounds and nuclear pursuit, indicating that in multilateral contexts
perceptions of other leaders may be moderated by the complexity of interactions with multiple
actors. In the next chapter I look at alliance formation in both bilateral and multilateral contexts, but
future work should consider how leaders consider their partners in other countries in multilateral
environments in more detail.
An important implication of this research is that perceptions of similarity between leaders
can contribute to nonproliferation. When leaders in protégé states see their superpower leader as
sharing similar background characteristics to themselves, they are more likely to trust promises of
protection making independent nuclear pursuit less likely. For states interested in nonproliferation,
recognizing and understanding the role of implicit psychological biases between leaders will be
important going forward. In particular, considering how to elevate and advertise similarities and
shared backgrounds between leaders may be particularly important, especially in relationships
where leaders see each other as very different.
While this chapter helps to answer the question of under what conditions states with extended
nuclear protection guarantees will feel motivated to pursue independent nuclear activity, it is not
able to answer broader questions related to alliance dynamics, including how shared leader back-
grounds influence alliance formation. I turn to this in the Chapter 4.
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4. BIRDS OF A FEATHER REDUX: THE IMPORTANCE OF SHARED LEADER
BACKGROUNDS FOR ALLIANCE FORMATION
What leads two states to ally together? In other words, why do alliances, or formal commit-
ments to cooperate among two or more states, form? When signing an alliance, states typically
promise some sort of action or behavior to their partner that they may not have otherwise under-
taken. In defense alliances for example, countries promise to come to their ally’s aid in the event of
war, while in neutrality agreements states promise to refrain from behaving aggressively towards
each other in the future. While alliances can lead to many benefits, including guarantees that an-
other state will refrain from violence, the aggregation of capabilities, and promises of assistance in
the event of attack, alliances are also costly to form.
Previous scholars have suggested numerous explanations for why states form alliances, sug-
gesting everything from shared security threats to ideological similarity and a partner’s prior repu-
tation for reliability. Each of these factors decreases the cost of forming an alliance by increasing
the perceived likelihood that an ally will be a reliable partner. Two states that share a security threat
for example are less likely to turn against each other because they face a common enemy. States
that have a reputation for upholding their alliances may be presumed to continue to be a reliable
ally in the future. I argue that an additional factor helps to explain alliance formation: shared sim-
ilarities between state leaders. When two leaders are more similar, they are more likely to see the
other as sincere in commitments to uphold promises and are more likely to implicitly believe the
other to be a better and more worthwhile partner.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I discuss previous explanations for alliance
formation, focusing in particular on the role of shared security threats, ideological similarity, and
reputation for the formation of international political alliances. This discussion illuminates a debate
about the role of leaders in influencing alliance formation, a topic I expand upon by distinguishing
between the importance of a state’s history for alliance reliability and its’ leaders ability to connect
with the leader of a potential ally state. In particular, I argue that the degree of similarity of
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backgrounds between leaders in a dyad impacts the ability of their governments to form alliances.
Leaders who see themselves as more similar to each other more easily empathize with the other and
see the alliance as more beneficial. In the following sections I discuss my research design, present
and discuss the results of my empirical analysis, and conclude by discussing the implications of
this research and outstanding questions.
4.1 Why Do States Form Alliances?
A rich literature examines the evolution of alliances between states, with scholars focusing on
the causes of alliance formation (e.g. Crescenzi et al., 2012; Walt, 1987, 1985), alliance reliability
(e.g. Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, 2003; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000), and alliance
termination (e.g. Leeds and Savun, 2007; Walt, 1997), with some scholars arguing these are in fact,
interconnected and related processes (Smith, 1995).
The question of alliance formation is interesting, because while there are benefits for forming
an alliance, including capability aggregation and potential increased deterrent capabilities, there
are also costs. Most notably, alliances may decrease autonomy by requiring coordination between
partners (e.g. Morrow, 1991) and may be counter-productive if allies are unwilling to uphold their
agreements. Military alliances for example signal a commitment to come to another state’s aid in
a conflict, which, if credible, should lead to decreased conflict initiation. Of course, sometimes
allies fail to follow through on their promises, to the detriment of their partner.
A key word here is credibility. Alliances are only beneficial when alliance commitments are
credible. Indeed, when there are concerns about the reliability of an alliance or an alliance partner,
alliances can do more harm than good. Thus, states should form alliances in part based on a belief
in the future solidity of an alliance agreement. Of course, in an anarchic international system, the
assurances of potential allies to be reliable partners are not alone enough to convince potential
allies. A lack of information about a potential partner’s true intentions means states can not just
evaluate a potential ally’s promises before deciding whether or not to trust their commitments. The
concern for forming reliable alliances can be seen not just in choice of who to ally with, but also
how to design alliances (e.g. Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Mattes, 2012).
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Deciding who to ally with is a complicated and weighty decision. Prior scholars suggest nu-
merous explanations for why states ally together. States facing common security threats may ally
together, judging that the common threat should be sufficient to keep the alliance strong. States
may also seek to ally with ideologically similar countries. Alternatively, states may seek allies that
have shown themselves to be reliable partners in the past, hoping that this history for reliability
suggests they will uphold commitments in the future. Each of these explanations is explored in
more detail below.1
Many scholars agree that a primary reason for the formation of an alliance has to do with
perceptions of external threats (though see also Kimball, 2010). There are disagreements about
whether states primarily balance against threats by allying with other states opposing a principal
threat, or whether states bandwagon by allying with the primary threatening state (Walt, 1985).
As Walt (1988, 278) notes, the answer to whether balancing or bandwagoning behavior is more
common has important implications: if balancing behavior is more common then leaders can be
more relaxed in the face of security threats since aggressive behavior is likely to be met with
numerous opponents. If bandwagoning behavior is more prominent on the other hand, then allies
are more likely to defect and major powers need to do more to closely bind allies and convince
partners of the credibility and longevity of security guarantees. In an analysis of Southwest Asian
countries during the Cold War, Walt (1988) finds that balancing is more likely.
A second explanation for the formation of international political alliances holds that alliances
are more likely to form between states that are ideologically similar. According to the “Birds
of a Feather Flocking Together” hypothesis, the more similar two or more states are, the more
likely they are to ally (Siverson and Emmons, 1991). In particular, democracies may be more
likely to ally together, though this may be contingent on era and context. Gartzke and Weisiger
(2012) for example argue that the ability of state ideology to influence decisions about alliance
formation depends on the composition of the international system: when democratic countries are
1Other explanations for alliance formation include the structure of alliance networks based on the structure of
international political alignments (Cranmer, Desmaris, and Kirkland, 2012) and domestic policy, either the ability of a
state to communicate potential reliability through domestic factors (Horowitz, Poast, and Stam, 2017), or the necessity
for leaders to ‘contract out’ security when facing internal demands (Kimball, 2010).
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scare, they are comparatively more likely to ally together than when democracy is widespread.
While many scholars point to the importance of similar ideology between states for influencing
cooperative behavior, Walt (1985) argues that in the alliance context similar political ideology is
generally considered at best a secondary explanation for alliance formation. Indeed, the ideological
similarity argument between states is challenged by many examples of ideologically similar states
facing recurring and enduring rivalries instead of enduring alliances (e.g. Pan-Arabism).
Prior scholars have debated whether leaders or states are the deciding and influential actor for
the formation of alliances. Gibler (2008) for example argues that a leader’s prior reputation for
upholding alliances contributes to other leaders’ decisions about whether or not to form an alliance
together. According to this argument, states are more likely to form alliances when their leaders
have prior reputations for upholding alliance commitments since other countries will judge them
as more reliable allies based on the leader’s history for upholding commitments. By contrast,
Crescenzi et al. (2012) argue that it is the state’s reliability as a whole, rather than an individual
leader’s reliability, that is important for dictating patterns of alliance formation. For Crescenzi et al.
(2012, 263-64), the state is the important unit of analysis for understanding the role of reputation
for alliance formation since alliances are sticky, leadership turnover is relatively common, and
decisions about alliance fulfillment are the result of of diverse domestic processes. While these
arguments make sense in relation to the appropriate way to consider assessments about reliability
for alliance formation decisions, leaders are nonetheless important in other ways. In the following
section I discuss how leaders matter for the formation of international alliances, building on my
theory and arguments from Chapters 2 and 3.
4.2 Identity and Trust in Alliance Formation
The previous discussion illuminates a debate about the role of leaders in influencing alliance
formation. While Gibler (2008) argues that leaders assess the reliability of other leaders for up-
holding alliance commitments, and use this information in part to decide which states to ally with,
Crescenzi et al. (2012) argue that leaders instead look to a state’s history for reliability in the al-
liance context, rather than to individual leaders. While it makes sense that a leader would consider
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a potential partner state’s history for upholding commitments beyond the tenure of the current
leader when deciding whether to form an alliance, this does not mean that leader relationships and
perceptions of others are unimportant.
While leaders may assess the reliability of a state as a whole, the ability of leaders to connect
with, understand, and empathize with one another is also important when deciding whether to form
an alliance. Since forming an alliance is costly, leaders need as many incentives as possible when
choosing alliance partners. While heads of state will consider their security environment and the
past reliability of potential partners, I argue they will also look to the specific leaders in charge, and
will be more inclined to ally with leaders they identify with. In particular, the degree of similarity
of backgrounds between leaders in a dyad impacts the ability of governments to form alliances.
Leaders who see themselves as more similar to each other leaders more easily empathize with the
other and come to see an alliance as more beneficial. This leads to the hypothesis,
Hypothesis 4. Ceteris paribus, leaders who share more similar backgrounds are more likely to
form alliances.
Of course, it may be the case that the type of alliance matters. While I have assumed thus far
that leaders have relatively short time horizons, and when deciding whether or not to ally with
another state privilege the current state of events and consider the current leader counterpart, this
may not always be the case. In particular, leaders may be comparatively more likely to ally with
similar leaders when looking for partners to face an imminent threat, rather than a far-off, possible
future threat, since there is more certainty that the partner leader that signs the alliance will remain
in office to uphold her commitment. This would suggest that the similarity of leader backgrounds
should matter less for the formation of defense alliances, since defense alliances are often formed
for the purpose of persisting through time to deter against far-off future threats. On the other hand,
the ability to form a connection with a partner leader may be more important in the case of defense
alliances, since these agreements may be seen as more costly to form, since they obligate a country
to provide military assistance for many years. This would in turn suggest that similarity between
leaders may be more important in the context of defense alliances compared to other alliance types.
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It may also be the case that the number of alliance partners that are party to a potential alliance
could influence decisions about whether to join or from an alliance. I assess each of these possi-
bilities - the role of defense alliance and the role of bilateral alliances - separately in the following
analysis, as well as considering whether shared leader backgrounds broadly influence alliance for-
mation. In the following section I discuss my research design in more detail before turning to a
discussion of the the results of my empirical analysis.
4.3 Research Design
Since I am interested in whether the bilateral relationship between pairs of leaders influences
the likelihood of alliance formation, my unit of analysis is the leader-dyad. My sample includes
all leader-pair years in the period from 1840–2000. The outcome of interest is alliance formation.
My binary dependent variable measures whether or not two states sign an alliance in a given year.
In other words, this variable measures the onset of an alliance and is coded 1 for the first year of
an alliance and 0 otherwise based on alliance data from Leeds et al. (2002). In the primary model,
this variable includes all alliance types and both bilateral and multilateral alliances. In secondary
analyses I look at just the onset of defense alliances, as well as the onset of bilateral alliances alone.
The primary independent variable is shared identity between leaders. As discussed in prior
chapters, individuals have myriad identities based on background characteristics, which may mat-
ter to different extents depending on context. Fundamental identities are characteristics that are
both strong enough for a leader to be defined by regardless of context, and are visible or knowable
to others (Jenkins, 2014). These major identities are formative, in that they help to shape how
an individual views herself, defines herself in relation to others, and places herself in relation to
the rest of the world. When leaders share a greater number of these formative identities they are
more able to relate to the other, can more easily empathize, and are less likely to see the other as
threatening. The major social identities below are based on Jenkins (2014), and are important for
allowing leaders to identify with and trust one another. Unless otherwise noted, the leader identity
variables are taken from the LEAD dataset (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam, 2015).
• SHARED EARLY LIFE EXPERIENCES: Leaders are coded as having a shared early life ex-
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perience if they shared the same number of parents growing up, were both orphans, or both
illegitimate.
• SHARED GENDER: Leaders are coded as having a shared gender if they are either both male
or both female.2
• SHARED SOCIAL STATUS: In the analysis that follows leaders are coded as having a shared
social status if they shared a similar socio-economic background, wealth, or level of educa-
tion.
• SHARED ADULT IDENTITIES: This is coded 1 if both leaders were married during their time
in power or had children, and 0 otherwise.
• SHARED MILITARY BACKGROUND: This is coded 1 if both leaders participated in the mili-
tary or if both leaders participated in a rebel movement, and 0 otherwise.
My theory predicts that leaders are more likely to form alliances with another state when they
are more similar to that state’s leader. The primary independent variable, IDENTITY SCORE, is
a count of the total number of shared identities ranging from zero to five, based on the typology
above, and described in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. This variable captures how likely two
leaders are to trust each other, based on the degree of shared identity, or how embedded the iden-
tities of the two leaders are. While gender, shared early life experiences, socio-economic status,
military background, and adult family life are not the only identities that can lead to trust, they are
easily observable or knowable by other leaders and have been shown in both previous literature
and in historical relationships to influence perceptions between individuals.
4.3.1 Additional Predictors
The primary explanations previously identified as contributing to decisions about alliance for-
mation are security, ideological similarity (particularly the presence of joint democracies), capa-
bility aggregation, and prior reputation as a good alliance partner. To account for each of these
2As noted in the Chapter 2, the historical scarcity of women leaders means jointly male dyads dominate the data.
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possible explanations, as well as additional potential confounders, I turn to data from Crescenzi
et al. (2012).3 While the alliance reputation and alliance history variables are unique to Crescenzi
et al. (2012), many of the other control variables are used in prior studies examining alliance for-
mation and alliance behavior (e.g. Gibler, 2008; Gibler and Wolford, 2006; Lai and Reiter, 2000).
• ALLIANCE REPUTATION measures how states perceive the reliability of potential allies,
based on the observed history of alliance reliability towards other states in the international
system. When states uphold their commitments to allies they are seen as more reliable,
while the violation of commitments makes states appear to be less reliable allies. This mea-
sure allows for past instances of (in)reliability to diminish through time such that more recent
alliance history is privileged in determining a potential ally’s reputation.4 The variable theo-
retically ranges from −1 to 1, though in the full sample it ranges from −0.318 to 0.611.
• ALLIANCE HISTORY captures the historical relationship between two states in a dyad. In
particular, if an ally becomes obligated to fulfill its agreement to a partner in a particular year
and does so, this is coded as a positive change for the relationship between those two states.
By contrast, if an ally becomes obligated to fulfill an agreement and does not, this results
in a negative change for the relationship.5 The difference between ALLIANCE HISTORY and
ALLIANCE REPUTATION is that while history is based solely on information between two
states in the dyad, reputation is based on extra-dyadic information, meaning how a potential
partner has historically behaved towards other states. ALLIANCE HISTORY theoretically
ranges from −1 to 1, though in the full sample it actually ranges from −0.33 to 0.68.
• PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY captures the level of similarity between the alliance portfolios of
both countries, since states with more shared allies should be more likely to ally together as
3Unless otherwise notes, data are from this source. A full replication of Crescenzi et al. (2012) is available in
Appendix C.
4For more details on how this variable is operationalized and constructed, see Crescenzi et al. (2012, 264–267).
Note that since beliefs about reliability are directional, meaning that state “i’s reputation for reliability as viewed by
country j is conceptually distinct from j’s reputation as perceived by i”, the data in this chapter are in a directed dyad
format (Crescenzi et al., 2012, 266).
5In the absence of challenged obligations, the variable decays towards zero, representing no information.
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well (Signorino and Ritter, 1999).
• INTERACTION SCORE measures the broader tone of the relationship between two states,
using MIDs to represent animosity and joint IGO memberships to represent cooperative be-
havior between states (see Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long, 2008, for more on this measure).
• JOINT ENEMY measures whether or not both states in a dyad have engaged in a militarized
interstate dispute with the same country during the past ten years, since the presence of a
joint enemy should suggest a security motivation to form an alliance (Jones, Bremer, and
Singer, 1996).
• DISTANCE captures the number of miles between the capital cities of each state in the dyad,
measured as the square root of the total distance.
• MAJOR POWER STATUS codes whether at least one of the states in the dyad is a global power,
since states may choose alliance partners based at least in part on the level of capabilities and
strength that a potential ally could contribute.
• POLITY DIFFERENCE measures the similarity of regime types in a particular dyad, based on
the absolute value of the difference in regime scores between two states. At larger values,
two states have more dissimilar regimes while at smaller values two states have more similar
regimes. The traditional “Birds of a Feather” hypothesis expects more similar states to form
alliances.
• JOINT DEMOCRACY is a dichotomous variable that measures whether or not both states in a
dyad are democracies. This measure is based on the Polity IV data and requires both states
to have a score of 5 or greater to be coded as 1, and is coded as 0 otherwise (Marshall and
Gurr, 2014).
Finally, the variable TIME measures the number of years since the two states in a dyad last
formed an alliance. This time variable, and the squared and cubic versions of the variable are
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included in all the subsequent logit models to account for possible temporal dependence (Carter
and Signorino, 2010).6 In the following section I discuss my model choices in greater detail before
presenting and interpreting the results of my empirical models.
4.4 Results and Discussion
The objective of my analysis is to test whether leaders are more likely to form alliances when
they are more similar to each other, while accounting for potential observable confounders. Some
confounders however may be unobservable, meaning it is impossible to control for them directly.
To address this, my primary logit models employ country dyadic fixed effects.7
Table 4.1 contains the results of my primary logit models. Model 1 tests the role of shared
leader backgrounds on the probability of alliance formation in a full sample of all alliances in
the period from 1840–2000. Model 2 limits the sample to bilateral alliances only. It may be the
case that the number of partners in an alliance influences whether leader similarity contributes to
alliance formation. Some prior scholars have argued that countries may be less concerned about
the trustworthiness of particular alliance partners in multilateral alliances, since unreliable allies
are more likely to be pooled into multilateral alliances to dilute risk (Narang and LeVeck, 2019).
Model 3 limits the sample to defense alliances only. It is important to examine defense pacts alone
for two reasons. First, defense alliances are some of the most important alliances to consider in
international relations because they are the type of alliance that obligates a state to militarily come
to its’ partner’s assistance during war. Defense alliances thus carry the most risk for abrogation
because abandoned allies would have counted on the support of their partners for survival. Sec-
ond, defense alliances are often signed with a longer expected time span. While other types of
alliances, such as offensive alliances, are often signed immediately prior to conflict and may be
terminated after joint objectives are met, defense alliances are usually signed during peacetime to
hedge against possible future threats, and often last for decades.
6TIME is coded as the number of years since the states in a dyad previously signed an alliance. The coding of this
variable differs in the models examining just bilateral alliances and just defense alliances, and is adjusted accordingly.
7A limitation of fixed effects models is that they tend to lead to a drastic reduction in sample size, since any groups
with zero within-group variance are dropped from the sample. In an additional model I utilize a fixed effect linear
probability model to assuage this concern and come to a similar substantive conclusion (See Appendix C).
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Table 4.1: Fixed effect logit analysis of alliance formation.
(1) (2) (3)
All Alliance Types Bilateral Alliances Defense Pacts
IDENTITY SCORE 0.0758∗∗ 0.0728∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0292)
ALLIANCE REPUTATION 3.928∗∗∗ 3.971∗∗∗ -0.308
(0.756) (0.673) (0.983)
ALLIANCE HISTORY -1.177 -1.111 -0.475
(1.899) (1.877) (1.953)
PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY -1.259∗∗∗ -1.244∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.129) (0.148)
INTERACTION SCORE (IIS) 0.851∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.185) (0.268)
JOINT ENEMY 0.962∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 1.597∗∗∗
(0.0381) (0.0380) (0.0478)
DISTANCE 0.00545 0.00480 -0.000517
(0.00657) (0.00659) (0.00825)
MAJOR POWER STATUS 0.274+ 0.295+ -0.0142
(0.154) (0.154) (0.181)
POLITY DIFFERENCE -0.0105∗ -0.0102∗ 0.00240
(0.00447) (0.00448) (0.00574)
JOINT DEMOCRACY 0.292∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.0724) (0.0725) (0.0984)
TIME -0.132∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.00567) (0.00567) (0.00711)
TIME 2 0.00262∗∗∗ 0.00263∗∗∗ 0.00350∗∗∗
(0.000206) (0.000206) (0.000233)
TIME 3 -0.0000130∗∗∗ -0.0000132∗∗∗ -0.0000157∗∗∗
(0.00000182) (0.00000182) (0.00000187)
Observations 166066 166066 124216
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
The time variables change for different DVs but are presented in the same line for the sake of space.
All predictors lagged by one year.
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Across all three of these primary models, the coefficient on IDENTITY SCORE is positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that the more similar two leaders are, the more likely they are to
form an alliance (see Table 4.1). Substantively, this means that a unit increase in identity score ex-
pands the odds of forming an alliance by 7.9% for all alliances, holding all else constant (Model 1).
Similarly, a unit increase in identity score expands the odds of forming a bilateral alliance by 7.6%,
holding all else constant (Model 2). Most notably, a unit increase in identity score expands the odds
of forming a defense pact by 17.3%, holding all else constant (Model 3). While these results sug-
gest that overall more similar leaders are more likely to form alliances even while accounting for
previous explanations for alliance formation, it may be the case that leader identification impacts
defense pact formation to a greater extent.
It may also be helpful to visually assess the influence of shared identity on alliance formation.
Figure 4.1 shows the logit coefficients for IDENTITY SCORE for Models 1, 2, and 3. Consistent with
Table 4.1, the coefficients for all three models are positive and do not cross zero, indicating that
more shared backgrounds between leaders make alliance formation between states more likely,
even while controlling for factors known to influence the likelihood of alliance formation and
potential confounding factors.
While the prior analysis privileges using a robust modeling strategy with the inclusion of dyadic
fixed effects, it results in the loss of potentially relevant observations. While the dyadic fixed effect
approach accounts for potential unobservable confounders, it does so at the loss of observations
because only observations with within-group variance through time are included. To allay concerns
about the loss of observations through the fixed effect logit model strategy, I re-run Model 1 from
Table 4.1 as a linear probability model (LPM), resulting in an over four times larger sample and
consistent results. The coefficient on IDENTITY SCORE is positive and statistically significant in
Model 4 in Table 4.2 (p < 0.01). A second modeling-related objection might be that alliances
are relatively rare events and a logit model may not be the best way to assess trends of alliance
formation. To assuage concerns in this regard, Model 5 uses a rare events logit specification and
reaches similar conclusions (see Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2: Robustness tests for alliance formation.
(4) (5)
Fixed Effect LPM Rare Events Logit
IDENTITY SCORE 0.000409∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.000144) (0.0199)
ALLIANCE REPUTATION 0.0964∗∗∗ 4.722∗∗∗
(0.00859) (0.579)
ALLIANCE HISTORY -0.0135 -0.983
(0.0325) (1.952)
PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY -0.00361∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.000894) (0.108)
INTERACTION SCORE (IIS) 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗
(0.00188) (0.227)




MAJOR POWER STATUS 0.000447 0.343∗∗∗
(0.000875) (0.0403)
POLITY DIFFERENCE -0.000136∗∗∗ -0.00690∗∗
(0.0000248) (0.00264)











Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Figure 4.1: Coefficient plot of Models 1-3.
4.5 Conclusion
The previous section demonstrates that leaders who share more similar background identities
are more likely to form international political alliances, even while controlling for potential con-
founding variables and factors that have been previously shown to influence patterns of alliance
formation. These findings are robust to model specification including the use of rare events logit
and a fixed effects probability model. The results also hold over different samples: alliances are
more likely to form between more similar leaders regardless of alliance size and alliance type.
Interestingly, the similarity of leaders may influence the process of alliance formation more in de-
fense alliances. More precisely, a unit increase in identity score expands the odds of forming a
defense pact by 17.3%, while a unit increase in identity score only expands the odds of forming an
alliance in general by 7.6%. Why is this the case?
A characteristic unique to defense pacts is how potentially costly they are. While defense pacts
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and offense pacts are both military alliances, meaning they both obligate their participants to be
prepared to use military force on behalf of another, defense pacts are much longer lasting than
offense pacts. Based on the ATOP data, defense pacts last on average 15 years, while offense
pacts on average last only seven years (Leeds et al., 2002, 2016 update). The relative longevity of
defensive alliances means they may obligate their participants to come to the aid of allies in future
situations where interests have changed, and may lead to a greater likelihood of future entrapment.
Leaders know the costs of signing defense pacts are high, and thus may seek more sources of
valuable information to determine whether forming a defense alliance is worth it. Knowing that
another leader is more similar to the self may increase the amount of information a head of state
has about a potential partner, and may sway her to more positively consider an alliance.
A weakness of this analysis is that I cannot determine why particular alliance types may be
affected to different extents by leadership similarity. Future work should consider this question,
as well as turning to the broader question of how different types of alliances may have differ-
ent sources of alliance formation motivations. In the next chapter I suggest other outstanding
questions, as well as summarizing my conclusions and suggesting important implications of this
research.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation addresses the questions of how relationships between leaders influence inter-
national politics, and to what extent interpersonal trust affects international cooperation. I argue
that leaders who share more similar backgrounds and identities trust each other more easily, making
cooperation more likely. This argument is based on theories and evidence from social psychology
and neuroscience that suggest that trust is easier when individuals are more similar, and that coop-
eration is more likely when trust is present. Chapter 1 begins by discussing the history of research
on trust, both within political science as well as in related social science disciplines. This discus-
sion makes clear that definitions of trust rely on two key concepts: First, a belief in the benevolent
intentions of other actors and second, a willingness to be vulnerable and accept risk.
The importance of risk for understanding trust contributes to the choice of contexts in which I
test my theory. For trust to be important, there must be a real chance of betrayal or hurt. What area
is better to study then, than international security, where scholars have long claimed that anarchy
and self-help incentives make cooperation risky and trust irrelevant? Specifically, I examine three
contexts to test my theory: nuclear cooperation, decisions by client states about whether to engage
in nuclear activity under extended deterrent guarantees, and alliance formation. Each of these
contexts carries risks for the actors involved. When signing a nuclear cooperation agreement, the
supplier country faces the risk that the recipient state could break their promise to use cooperation
for purely civilian purposes, and instead direct assistance towards weapons pursuit. Countries
under guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence from superpower patron states face risks that the
promise may not be sincere, resulting in the need to pursue a more independent security posture.
States forming alliances together face risks that their partner might one day betray them or abrogate
the alliance agreement.
In each of these circumstances then, leaders must consider ways to ameliorate the potential
risk. What diminishes these possible threats and makes leaders more confident that cooperation
with another state is worthwhile? Previous accounts of trust in international relations privilege
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rationalist explanations for cooperation, including forming opinions about others based on the
expectation of reciprocity or the belief that interests with another actor align. These explanations
for cooperation relate to rationalist arguments about the role of signaling for demonstrating the
credibility of promises. While these rationalist explanations are surely important, I argue that as
human beings who feel, think, and form implicit biases and opinions about others, leaders also
base their decisions off more personal and psychological factors.
In each substantive chapter then, I try to account for strategic factors that could contribute
to decisions to cooperate, as well as including my own measure of shared background identities.
In the context of nuclear cooperation, I account for shared defense alliances and rivals as well as
dyadic conflict. In the chapter on extended deterrence I include signals of credibility – such as troop
deployments and nuclear basing – as well as accounting for regime type, past conflict, and a host
of other factors. When testing my theory in the context of alliance formation, I account for prior
explanations including reputation, ideological similarity, and states’ security environments. Prior
work has shown these factors to be important. Moreover, I believe that strategic considerations
surely contribute to leader decision-making. By examining my shared identity variable alongside
previous factors that have been shown to affect the probability of cooperation in three contexts, I
hope to show that affective attributes matter for decision-making as well.1
My theory predicts that leaders who share more similar social identities should be more likely
to cooperate with one another, holding all else constant. This means that signing a nuclear cooper-
ation agreement and forming an alliance should be more likely when two leaders are more similar
to each other, all else equal. By contrast, proliferation should be less likely when there are more
shared identities between client and patron state leaders, since the client state will more easily trust
the promises of their patron for protection. Throughout the dissertation I find evidence consistent
with my expectations based on my empirical analyses and historical illustrations and examples.2
1For a full elucidation of variables used and theories considered, see the research design sections of Chapters 2-4.
In addition to accounting for observable confounders, I also utilize country dyadic fixed effects throughout the analyses
to account for time-invariant unobservable considerations.
2As I continue this research going forward, it is my hope to turn to more case analyses to develop more qualitative
evidence to support my theory.
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In Chapter 2, I find that leaders are more likely to sign nuclear cooperation agreements when they
are more similar. In Chapter 3, I find that client state leaders are less likely to engage in nuclear
activity when they are protected by a patron state with a leader to whom they are more similar.
In Chapter 4, I find that countries are more likely to sign alliances when leaders of potential ally
states are more similar. While these findings are striking in and of themselves given past emphasis
on rationalist explanations for cooperation, it is important to also consider the implications of this
research for both academia and policy. In the following section I discuss what I think are some
of the most important take-aways of this research. I then turn to outstanding questions for future
research based on weaknesses of the current analysis and questions that have arisen during this
research.
5.1 Implications
Throughout this dissertation I argue that relationships matter. In other words, the ways in
which leaders view themselves and others influence decisions about whether or not to cooperate
with other countries on a wide variety of issues. An important question though, is “so what”?
Does this research suggest that only leaders who are similar to each other will be able to cooperate
together? If so, what does this mean for future leaders who may not share similar identities?
Several points are important to make in this regard. First, cooperation can occur when interper-
sonal or affective trust is low but cognitive trust or an understanding of shared strategic incentives
are strong. Second, my empirical evidence thus far suggests that leaders are more likely to cooper-
ate on average when they are more similar, all else being equal. Third, while my measure of shared
identity is constructed based on theories that point to important formative characteristics that lead
to identification with others, it is not exhaustive. Individuals have myriad identities which can con-
tribute to positive perceptions of another. Future work should consider when different identities
are important, as well as working to collect data on and analyze unaccounted for factors, including
religion, ethnicity, and language (this is discussed below in greater detail).
The most important take-away is that leaders matter, and more precisely that the relationships
between leaders and the way leaders view one another contribute to decision-making and political
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behavior in world politics. In particular this research suggests, counter to realist arguments, that
there is a place for trust in the international system. This is important because when actors need
to cooperate in comparatively low trust environments, the cost of cooperation is higher, since
structures and procedures need to be built and established to take the place of trust. On the other
hand, when actors find it easier to trust each other, they are more likely to cooperate, even in
situations when cooperation is not expected.
An important implication that arises from this discussion is the possibility that shared identities
can be built or made more important through time. Evidence from sociology suggests that in-group
similarity and new identities may be able to be constructed through cooperation. Sherif et al.
(1961/1988) advanced the study of intergroup relations through the now famous Boy’s Summer
Camp experiment. After arbitrarily dividing campers into two groups and keeping the groups in
isolation for eight days, the campers were found to have pervasive biases in favor of members
of their own group over members of the other group. The recognition that shared identity leads
to positive opinions of similar individuals while dissimilar identities leads to negative views of
others has led to a large research tradition in sociology, as discussed throughout Chapters 1 and 2.
This experiment also points to the possibility of creating biases in favor of cooperation with others
based on experienced similarities and designed shared characteristics. In the international context
for example, it is possible that by repeatedly interacting with another leader in a particular forum,
two leaders could build a shared understanding as part of the same organization. This remains
an area that requires future attention, but is also related to the question of how interactions and
face-to-face meetings between leaders contribute to interpersonal trust. I turn to this consideration
and other outstanding questions in the next section.
5.2 Remaining Questions for Future Research
5.2.1 The Role of Face to Face Contact
I do not assume in this dissertation that leaders need to meet with one another to be able
to form impressions (either positive or negative) about the other. Rather, due to the provision
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of intelligence assessments and character briefs on other leaders, as well as open source media
reporting that covers world leaders, I assume that heads of state have sufficient information to
make initial judgments about others regardless of the degree of in-person interaction. In many
ways, this is a fair assumption. After all, more often than not leaders need to form at least their
initial impression of another without in-person interaction. Moreover, these biases in many ways
contribute to the decision to interact in the first place, as was the case between Brazilian and
Argentine leaders in 1980 (see Chapter 2).
While I do control for foreign visits by leaders in Chapter 3, an outstanding question is how
face-to-face interactions with another leader influence impressions of another. This relates to liter-
ature on diplomacy and trust-building as a process. Wheeler (2018) and Holmes and Yarhi-Milo
(2017) for example focus on face-to-face interactions between leaders and Yarhi-Milo (2014, 210)
points to the process through which Reagan and Gorbachev increased their understanding of each
other.
It is conceivable that meeting with a partner leader could positively or negatively influence
perceptions of another, or have no impact at all. If a leader goes into a meeting inclined to trust
another based on shared characteristics for example, but by meeting in person gets additional
information about their partner leader that challenges their initial positive feeling, the prior belief
about another person’s implicit trustworthiness might be challenged or revised. Conversely, if a
leader has a negative conception about another based on dissimilarity to the self, meeting in person
could conceivably reveal other points on which there are similarities, leading to increased trust.
Future research should turn to the question of whether interactions and face-to-face diplomacy
interact with my understanding of trust, and if so how. Considering interactional accounts could
also help to get leverage on the question of the extent to which advisers and adviser relationships
contribute to decision-making.
5.2.2 Trust and Mistrust
Throughout the dissertation I have focused on the role of trust for contributing to decisions
about cooperation. The flipside of trust is of course mistrust, and questions about what happens
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when trust fails. History demonstrates the risk of trusting foreign leaders. When American Pres-
ident Eisenhower sent a U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union prior to the Paris Summit, Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev was reportedly outraged by the betrayal of trust, and complained over
and over to the British Prime Minister that “his friend (bitterly repeated again and again), his friend
Eisenhower has betrayed him” (Larson, 1997b, 715). Failed trust between political leaders can lead
to the outbreak of war, abandonment by allies, or to nuclear arms races.
The three contexts I look at, nuclear cooperation, proliferation under deterrence, and alliance
formation, capture the result of a leader’s decision to trust another. I find that shared background
identities between leaders make cooperation more likely, proliferation less likely, and alliance
formation more likely. What happens next however? If a partner in the future goes on to break her
promise regarding peaceful nuclear activities, to engage in proliferation, or to abrogate a treaty,
how does this affect the relationship between the leaders and their propensity to trust? Further, are
agreements based on affective interpersonal trust more or less likely to be abrogated compared to
agreements made based on strategic incentives to cooperate?
5.2.3 Time Horizons
The concern about the potential for trust backfiring in the future relates to a broad question
about the role of time horizons and expectations in leader relationships. Throughout this paper,
I assume that leaders have relatively short time horizons, and privilege the current over possible
futures. Future research should turn to the question of whether leaders do in fact have short time
horizons with regards to decisions about who to cooperate with, and ask whether certain types of
leaders or certain contexts lead to more or less concern for the future.
In the context of my argument about trust between pairs of leaders, it may be the case that
even if two leaders have a trusting relationship, this may not be important if one cannot expect the
other to remain in power in the future. Leaders who are expected to remain in office in the future,
or who are expected to be replaced with a very similar leader, may be more capable of working
towards cooperation with trusted partners. It may instead be the case that calculations about a
leader’s tenure only matter in certain issue areas in which the future is weighted highly, or that
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calculations about the future involvement of a particular leader matters relatively little if leaders
heavily discount the future.
5.2.4 The Role of Culture
Throughout this dissertation I employ country dyadic fixed effects to account for possible un-
observable, time invariant factors between two countries. Theoretically, this should account for
things like geographic distance and culture. In the future however it may be important to think in
more detail about how culture affects trust and cooperation. If trust is understood, built, and main-
tained differently across cultures, then there could be implications for how leaders interact and
make decisions. Additionally, trust can be thought to involve sending signals about one’s trustwor-
thiness, which may of course vary across cultures in both meaning and interpretation (Saunders
et al., 2010). Thus, understanding how trust is formed and maintained across different cultures
may be important for understanding how countries identify and interpret signals. In my statistical
analysis I use country dyadic fixed effects which may account for culture to a certain extent. Future
work however should consider how culture matters more deeply.
Though the major accounts of trust in political science do not consider cultural differences in
how trust is understood, formed, and relied on, it is common in other fields to consider the role of
culture in trust.3 The need to look at trust cross-culturally stems from Knack and Keefer (1997),
who found that trust differs across nations. Cross-cultural differences in conceptions of trust are
present both in conceptions of generalized trust, as well as in interpersonal and individualistic
trust (Zak and Knack, 2001; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Sullivan et al., 1981). Cultural divisions
of course do not necessarily follow national boundaries, since culture is shaped by many, often
interconnected spheres of influence, but it is common to distinguish among cultures based on
geographic boundaries (Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao, 2010, 7).
Scholars have used experiments in multiple countries to compare trust across cultures. Za-
3The major exception is Uslaner (2002, 13), who finds that cross-national variations in trust depend on the distribu-
tion of income in society: “The same factor that led to the decline in interpersonal trust in the United States – economic
inequality – also explains why some nations are more trusting than others.” Similarly, some political scientists that
use social surveys to examine cross-national levels of generalized trust examine multiple nations, though these efforts
have been critiqued (Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao, 2010; Wilson and Eckel, 2010; Levi and Stoker, 2000).
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heer and Zaheer (2006) and Yuki et al. (2005) for example find differences in how Americans and
Japanese trust. In the United States, trust is more commonly built through shared category mem-
berships. By contrast, in Japan trust is more easily identified based on shared interpersonal links
between actors. Thus while Western cultures emphasize categorical differences between ingroups
and outgroups, the authors argue that East Asians think about groups as relationship based (see also
Yamagashi, Cook, and Watabe, 1998). Other scholars have found differences between Bulgarians
and Americans (Koford, 2001), Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, and Americans (Buchan, Croson, and
Dawes, 2002), and Chinese and Taiwanese (Shi, 2001).
There have also been numerous within-country experiments to assess the role of trust in dif-
ferent cultures, including in Zimbabwe (Barr, 2003), Thailand and Vietnam (Carpenter, Daniere,
and Takahashi, 2004), Peru (Karlan, 2005), Bangladesh (Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, and Mar-
tinsson, 2008), Paraguay (Schechter, 2007), Russia and Post-Soviet countries (Mishler and Rose,
2005, 2001), and Kenya (Greig and Bohnet, 2008). More could be done however to consider how
cultural differences affect trust and cooperation between leaders in a cross-national context.
5.2.5 Other Issue Areas
Some scholars hold that the concept of trust can be applied equally across issue areas and
to a variety of different actors. Others take more measured approaches to the generalizability
of trust, arguing that trust in a particular issue area can lead to trust in others: “as relationships
mature through experience in different contexts and around different inter-dependencies, parties
accumulate deeper and more extensive knowledge about each others strengths and weaknesses”
(Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao, 2010, 11-12).
Other scholars hold that levels of trust are completely contingent on both context and partner, in
other words: “to say that I trust you in some context is to say that I think you are or will be trustwor-
thy towards me in that context” (Hardin, 2006, 1).4 Larson (1997b, 715) also holds this opinion,
arguing that trust does not imply trusting in every situation, since that would indicate “blind faith”.
Rather, assessments of trustworthiness many be contingent on particular situations. For example,
4And see also Hoffman (2002, 377–378).
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“after World War II, the United States generally trusted the Soviets to repay a loan for postwar
reconstruction, but not to refrain from moving into the power vacuum in Central Europe.” In addi-
tion to the outstanding questions discussed above, there are several potentially fruitful contexts in
which to test and extend my theory.
5.2.5.1 Nuclear Latency
There has been a massive growth in scholarship on the causes and consequences of nuclear
latency, or the technical capability of a state to build nuclear weapons, in recent years. There is
huge variation in how states that posses, or have historically possessed nuclear latency through
time are treated. Some nations are treated like pariahs, automatically assumed to have malicious
intentions, or be unworthy of possessing nuclear latency. Other states are allowed, or even encour-
aged to develop latent nuclear capabilities by other countries. There may also be variation through
time, such that the way a nation’s ENR abilities are perceived differ based on the personality and
characteristics of the leader in office. Future research could examine American responses to the
latent status of other countries based on leadership similarity, asking whether trust by American
leaders in other heads of state influences nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies against
foreign latent nuclear states.
5.2.5.2 Alliance Reliability and Termination
In Chapter 3 I examined the role of shared backgrounds in decisions by leaders about whether
or not to form alliances. Future work could consider the full evolution of an alliance relationship,
looking at instances of alliance violation and termination in addition to formation. This analysis
would in many ways link to the questions of mistrust and time horizons, since it would involve
examining cases of the failure of trust in the future.
5.2.5.3 Non-Security Contexts
The three contexts in which I have tested my theory all exist in the realm of international
security. The choice to look at nuclear cooperation and alliances was both theoretical and strategic,
based on the importance of risk for trust and cooperation and on my own expertise. Going forward
97
however it would be useful to think about how these arguments would apply outside the realm of
international security. One potentially fruitful context would be to look at trade negotiations.
5.2.6 Further Data Collection
While my primary independent variable is based on theories and evidence from sociology,
psychology, and neuroscience, the way I currently construct and conceptualize of SHARED IDEN-
TITY relies on current data availability, for which there are some limitations. While there have
been massive strides made on data collection and availability on leaders in recent years (e.g. Ellis,
Horowitz, and Stam, 2015; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009), this dissertation makes clear
that there are some areas that remain under-studied. In particular, more questions about leader
relationships and how leaders influence international politics could be answered with better data
on leader religion, language, and ethnicity.
With regard to religion, there is evidence from other fields that individuals who are more reli-
gious are more trusting (Rotter, 1967). It may also be the case that individuals that share a religion
are more trusting of each other (Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, and
Martinsson, 2008; Danielson and Holm, 2007). Additional research points to the importance of
religion for understanding trust and cooperation (Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, and Martinsson,
2008; Cronin, 1999; Rotter, 1967). In the future, it would be useful to know whether individual
leaders were religious or not, and which religions they ascribed to.
In addition to religion, discussions with diplomats and negotiators make clear that language
can be a key barrier to cooperation. If a translator is needed during any sort of negotiation, be it
peace talks or nuclear training, understanding and trust may be limited. While many leaders speak
more than one language and thus may be able to effectively communicate with others, there are
no systematic data currently available coding leader language capabilities. Individuals that share
a language may find it easier to communicate and find it easier to trust each other. Not having to
rely on a translator, and not having to be unsure of what others are saying may be one reason why
shared language makes it easier to trust. A person’s native language, as well as the languages they
are able to speak may be important to consider in the future as well.
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Finally, another important variable to consider in the future is a leaders’ ethnicity. Individuals
with shared ethnic ties can likely identify more easily and trust each other. Halperin (2015, 41) for
example recounts the statements of an individual during an interview discussing feelings towards
Palestinians: “They will never change. They were born unfaithful, and they will die this way. Even
after 40 years in the grave, you shouldn’t trust an Arab” (see also Post and George, 2004; Davies,
1996). Pettigrew (1979) argues that the tendency for members of ethnic and racial out-groups to
view each other negatively is due to a so-called “attribution error”, which results from attributing
antisocial behavior from ingroup members to a specific situation, while attributing similar antiso-
cial behavior from outgroup members to disposition (see also Brewer, 1986; Heradstveit, 1979;
Taylor and Jaggi, 1974, for further support of this argument). One of the key difficulties in coding
data on ethnicity will be defining ethnicity in a universally accepted manner, while also recognizing
how perceptions of ethnic identification may vary cross-culturally and at a more granular level.
5.3 The Last Word
This dissertation argues that relationships between leaders and the way leaders view one an-
other influences patterns of international cooperation. Specifically, leaders who are more similar to
each other find it easier to trust, making cooperation on a variety of issues more likely. Empirical
analysis of three contexts supports this claim: countries with leaders who share more similar back-
grounds are more likely to sign nuclear cooperation agreements and form alliances with each other,
and are less likely to worry about the credibility of extended deterrent guarantees. This manuscript
contributes to understanding how leaders and identity matter in international politics, and suggests
many avenues for continuing research.
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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A.1 shows the results of my primary logit analysis of nuclear cooperation agreements.
Table A.2 shows the results of a logit analysis of the model utilizing an interaction of IDENTITY
SCORE and CONSTRAINT. Table A.3 gives the results of a fixed effect linear probability model of
nuclear cooperation agreements.
A.1 Full Results
Table A.1: Logit analysis of nuclear cooperation agreements.
Coefficient Standard Error
IDENTITY SCORE 0.240∗∗∗ (0.0376)
POLITICAL CONSTRAINT 0.683∗∗∗ (0.192)
SHARED ALLIANCE 1.239∗∗∗ (0.0965)
DYADIC CONFLICT -0.681 (0.701)
SHARED RIVAL 0.504∗∗∗ (0.110)








Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All variables lagged by one year.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.2: Interaction of political constraint and shared identity.
Coefficient Standard Error
IDENTITY SCORE 0.388∗∗∗ (0.0675)
POLITICAL CONSTRAINT 2.481∗∗∗ (0.655)
IDENTITY×CONSTRAINT -0.494∗∗ (0.171)
SHARED ALLIANCE 1.230∗∗∗ (0.0962)
DYADIC CONFLICT -0.692 (0.696)
SHARED RIVAL 0.509∗∗∗ (0.109)








Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All variables lagged by one year.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Standard errors in parentheses.
All variables lagged by one year.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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A.2 Distributional Details
Figure A.1 shows the distribution of the IDENTITY SCORE variable in the full sample as well
as in the sample of only dyads with NCA’s.
Figure A.1: Distribution of identity score in full sample (left) and in NCA-only dyads (right).
A.3 More Details on Constraint (Henisz, 2002)
Political constraint is coded based on the domestic institutional constraint of the recipient, mea-
sured as whether a change in one actor’s preferences leads to a change in government policy. In
other words, it measures the feasibility of policy change, or the extent to which a change in the
preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy. The Henisz (2002) mea-
sure begins by examining the number of independent branches of government with veto power
over policy change. Henisz (2002) then develops a spatial model of policy interaction to derive
a score for the extent of actor constraint in future policy choices. The preferences of each of the
branches of government and the status quo policy are assumed to be independently and identically
drawn from a uniform, uni-dimensional policy space. This allows for the derivation of a quan-
titative measure of institutional hazards. The measure is then modified to take into account the
extent of alignment across branches of government using data on party composition of the execu-
tive and legislative branches. Alignment across branches should increase the feasibility of policy
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Figure A.2: US domestic political constraint through time (Polity=10).
change. The measure is also modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each
legislative branch. Higher levels of heterogeneity should increase the costs of overturning policies.
A potential concern about this measure might be that there may not be enough variation within
countries through time, especially for the dyadic fixed effects models. Figure A.2 demonstrates
however how the measure of institutional constraint can vary through time, even in a country
known to be a consistent democracy (the United States).
There are several reasons why I theorize about the importance of political constraint for leaders
in recipient countries rather than about levels of constraint that affect leaders in supplier nations.
NCA’s are often something that leaders deal with directly, and attach importance to getting through,
even when there is opposition from other bodies of government. The personal involvement of
leaders in supplier countries can be seen in the case of American assistance to India in 2008, with
President Bush making it clear that the deal was a priority for him and that the US was going to sign
it despite opposition in Congress. Even more importantly, my theory of when suppliers can trust
recipients puts the onus on the supplier country to decide whether or not recipient leaders can keep
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their word. That being said, I do test the role of supplier constraint on nuclear cooperation and do
not find support for identity affecting NCA’s more or less at different levels of supplier constraint,
since the effect of identity on the probability of nuclear cooperation is positive and statistically
significant at all levels of political constraint (See Figure A.3).
Figure A.3: Average marginal effect of identity score, 95% confidence intervals.
A.4 Additional Tests
Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 provide the results of additional robustness tests mentioned in Chapter
2.
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Table A.4: Additional analysis of nuclear cooperation agreements, Part 1.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Limited 5 Year Country Country & Ideology Mundlak
Sample Lag FE Time FE Included Model
IDENTITY SCORE 0.236∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.054) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.000)
IDENTITY SCORE- 6 0.206∗∗∗
(0.042)
CONSTRAINT -0.138 1.092∗∗∗ -0.750∗∗ -0.788∗∗ 0.601∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.331) (0.196) (0.257) (0.258) (0.224) (0.002)
SHARED ALLIANCE 1.379∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.225) (0.225) (0.101) (0.004)
SHARED RIVAL 0.782∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗ -0.368∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.002)
DYADIC CONFLICT -1.558 0.423 -1.324+ -1.355+ -0.938 -0.012∗
(0.962) (0.421) (0.745) (0.748) (0.965) (0.005)
JOINT DEMOCRACY 0.708∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.157 0.203+ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.0922) (0.104) (0.106) (0.094) (0.001)
RGDP1 0.000 -0.000+ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RGDP2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TIME -0.134∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ 0.023 0.017 -0.120∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.000)
TIME2 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
TIME3 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CONSTANT -3.888∗∗∗ -5.367∗∗∗ -5.278∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.169) (0.187) (0.005)
Observations 15632 131115 26677 26677 82934 141025
Decade dummies in Model 6 omitted for space. Mean values in Model 8 omitted for space.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table A.5: Additional analysis of nuclear cooperation agreements, Part 2.
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Rare Event Affinity Distance Trade Exports First NCA
IDENTITY SCORE 0.239∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.055)
CONSTRAINT 0.683∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗
(0.156) (0.208) (0.193) (0.191) (0.191) (0.233)
JOINT ALLIANCE 1.238∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.237∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.099) (0.102) (0.094) (0.094) (0.092)
DYADIC CONFLICT -0.433 0.153 -0.728 -0.694 -0.693 -0.761
(0.711) (0.679) (0.698) (0.700) (0.700) (1.018)
SHARED RIVAL 0.505∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.117) (0.111) (0.108) (0.108) (0.122)
JOINT DEMOC 0.675∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.084) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.099)
rGDP1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rGDP2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗









CONSTANT -5.601∗∗∗ -5.547∗∗∗ -5.459∗∗∗ -5.701∗∗∗ -5.706∗∗∗ -6.891∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.197) (0.181) (0.165) (0.165) (0.240)
Observations 141025 109648 141025 138954 138954 134799
Standard errors in parentheses.
Time cubic polynomials omitted for space.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
126




























Standard errors in parentheses.
Time cubic polynomials omitted for space.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Additional Tables and Models
Table B.1 includes the full results for Models 1-6 underlying Figure 3.1. Models 1-3 are the
primary models included in Table 3.1. Models 4-6 are the models including including multilateral
alliances in addition to bilateral alliances.
Table B.2 includes the results of a full sample of American or Soviet leader dyads with an
interaction of bilateral DEFENSE ALLIANCES and IDENTITY SCORE. While sharing an identity
with another leader and having a bilateral defense arrangement with either the US or USSR tends
to on average increase the probability of ENR activity, when there is a defense alliance, having a
shared identity with the patron state leader decreases the likelihood of nuclear activity.
Table B.3 includes the results of four linear probability models (LPMs) with fixed effects.
While these models are not designed to deal with binary dependent variables, they do allow for the
inclusion of more observations while still employing fixed effects. Models 9 and 10 in Table B.3
replicate the primary models in the body of the paper with a LPM FE specification. Models 11 and
12 in Table B.3 replicate the interaction models in Table B.2 with a LPM FE specification.
Table B.4 includes the results of seven additional robustness tests mentioned in the paper.
Model 13 employs country dyadic fixed effects on a linear probability model, allowing for the
inclusion of a larger number of observations compared to the primary fixed effect logit specifi-
cation. Model 14 is a rare events logit model, to account for the fact that nuclear pursuit is a
relatively rare phenomena. Model 15 is a logit model without fixed effects. Model 16 omits the
12 bilateral alliances signed prior to nuclear weapon acquisition by the US or USSR.1 Models 17
and 18 use an alternate dependent variable based on updated data on nuclear pursuit from Singh
1In the primary analysis these 12 alliances are included for the years in which they remain active and the patron



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.2: Interaction of bilateral alliance and shared identity, full sample.
(7) (8)
Interaction, Basic Interaction, Full
IDENTITY SCORE 0.495∗ 0.459+
(0.236) (0.245)
BILATERAL DEFENSE 6.827∗∗∗ 6.233∗∗∗
(1.766) (1.820)










TOTAL NCA’S BY YEAR t 0.0124
(0.0149)









Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table B.3: Linear probability models.
(9) (10) (11) (12)
LPM FE 1 LPM FE 2 LPM FE LPM FE
Interaction 1 Interaction 2
IDENTITY SCORE -0.0648∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗ 0.0132 0.00946
(0.0172) (0.0175) (0.00991) (0.00976)
BILATERAL DEFENSE 0.350∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.0832) (0.0827)
IDENTITY × DEFENSE -0.0624∗∗∗ -0.0605∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0185)
GDP 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DEMOCRACY -0.150∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ 0.0245 0.00468





TOTAL NCA’S BY YEAR t -0.00141 0.00378∗∗∗
(0.00168) (0.000585)
MID: 5 YEAR MOVING AVERAGE -0.0401∗∗∗ -0.0440∗∗∗
(0.00830) (0.00698)
CONSTANT 0.181∗ 0.214∗∗ -0.00178 0.0812+
(0.0719) (0.0800) (0.0440) (0.0442)
Observations 765 755 2277 2267
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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and Way (2004).2 Model 19 includes year fixed effects to account for possible temporal effects
(year dummies omitted for space). Across all seven of these models, the coefficient on IDENTITY
SCORE is negative and statistically significant.
B.2 Alliances
Table B.5 lists the bilateral defense alliances included in the analyses signed after the US or
USSR became a nuclear weapon state. In the primary analysis, the 12 bilateral alliances signed
prior to weaponization are included for the years in which the patron state had nuclear weapons
(see “active” column in Table B.9).
B.2.1 Coding Notes
• In the primary analysis, I include all defense alliances active while either the US or USSR
had nuclear weapons. A small number of alliances (12 bilateral alliances and one multilateral
alliance) were signed prior to either 1945 for the US or 1949 for the USSR, but remained
active after each state acquired nuclear weapons. These alliances are included in the primary
analysis. For example, in the case of ATOP 2535, while the alliance lasts from 1941 to
1955, it is only coded as a nuclear security commitment in the dataset from 1949 (after the
USSR got nuclear weapons) until 1952 (when Britain got nuclear weapons). In a secondary
analysis, an alliance is included only if it was signed after 1945 for the US or after 1949 for
the USSR, resulting in the loss of 12 bilateral alliances from the analysis. See Table B.9 for
additional details.
• The three Soviet successor states that inherited and gave up nuclear weapons are not coded
as nuclear weapon states, since there is no indication that they pursued autonomous devel-
opment of nuclear weapons, and they arranged to promptly give up their inherited warheads
and materials at the end of the Cold War.
2For further details on this variable, see the next section.
3China became a NWS in 1964 and does not appear in the analysis after this time.
4Pakistan became a NWS in 1972 and does not appear in the analysis after this time.
5While this was signed as a multilateral agreement with New Zealand, it became a bilateral agreement in 1986






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.5: Bilateral security guarantees.
ATOP ID Patron Protégé Signed Ended
3200 USSR China 1950 19803
3210 US Philippines 1951 –
3220 US Japan 1951 1960
3240 US South Korea 1953 –
3270 US Taiwan 1954 1980
3355 US Pakistan 1959 –4
3360 US Turkey 1959 –
3365 US Iran 1959 1979
3375 US Japan 1960 –
3440 USSR/Russia North Korea 1961 1996
3480 US Spain 1963 1970
3500 USSR East Germany 1964 1990
3520 USSR Poland 1965 1991
3535 USSR/Russia Mongolia 1966 1993
3560 USSR/Russia Bulgaria 1967 1992
3580 USSR Hungary 1967 1991
3630 USSR Romania 1970 1991
3745 USSR East Germany 1975 1990
3750 US Spain 1976 1981
3795 US Panama 1977 1999
4235 Russia Kazakhstan 1992 –
4245 Russia Uzbekistan 1992 –
4255 Russia Kyrgyzstan 1992 –
4300 Russia Turkmenistan 1992 2002
4470 Russia Tajikistan 1993 –
4865 Russia Belarus 1997 –
4890 Russia Armenia 1997 –
5075 Russia Uzbekistan 2005 –
3215 US Australia 1951 –5
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• After 1986, the Mutual Defense Agreement between the US and Australia is essentially a
bilateral defense agreement because New Zealand was no longer party to the treaty.
• ATOP 2550 is omitted from all analyses. The alliance covered allied states during WWII,
but terminated on September 2, 1945, less than a month after the bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki and thus was never intended to provide a nuclear guarantee.
B.3 Pursuit
While I primarily uses ENR data from Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) to measure nuclear interest,
the results from a secondary analysis in Table B.4 use an updated measure of nuclear activity from
Singh and Way (2004). The updated data through 2012 come from Lanoszka (2018), and are
provided in table B.10.
B.4 Signals
B.4.1 Foreign Deployed Nuclear Weapons
Data on the foreign deployment of nuclear weapons from either the US or USSR are from
Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014) and cover the period from 1950–2000. “Accidental” deployments
from the USSR to successor states after the Cold War (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), de-
ployments of warheads without fissile cores, and US deployments to Japanese occupied territories
under American control are not included.
6Britain became a NWS in 1952 and therefore does not appear in the analysis after this time.
7France became a NWS in 1960 and therefore does not appear in the analysis after this time.
8Germany replaces West Germany in 1990.
9France became a NWS in 1960 and therefore does not appear in the analysis after this time. France stopped
participating militarily in SEATO in 1967 and stopped financial contributions in 1974.
10While the alliance did not dissolve until 1955, Britain became a NWS in 1952.
12Years of nuclear weapon (NW) activity from revised 2012 list of activities from Singh and Way (2004).
13ENR plant activity from Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015).
14S: signature; D: deposit; O: withdrawal.
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Table B.6: Asymmetric multilateral security guarantees.
Name ATOP ID Patron Protégé Signed Ended
Rio Treaty 3075 US Bahamas 1982 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Cuba 1947 1962
Rio Treaty 3075 US Haiti 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Dominican Republic 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Trinidad and Tobago 1967 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Mexico 1947 2014
Rio Treaty 3075 US Guatemala 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Honduras 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US El Salvador 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Nicaragua 1948 2014
Rio Treaty 3075 US Costa Rica 1947–
Rio Treaty 3075 US Panama 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Colombia 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Venezuela 1947 2015
Rio Treaty 3075 US Ecuador 1949 2016
Rio Treaty 3075 US Peru 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Brazil 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Bolivia 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Paraguay 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Chile 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Argentina 1947 –
Rio Treaty 3075 US Uruguay 1947 –
OAS 3150 US Bahamas 1982
OAS 3150 US Cuba 1948 1962
OAS 3150 US Haiti 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Dominican Republic 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Jamaica 1969 –
OAS 3150 US Trinidad and Tobago 1967 –
OAS 3150 US Barbados 1967 –
OAS 3150 US Dominica 1979 –
OAS 3150 US Grenada 1975 –
OAS 3150 US St. Lucia 1979 –
OAS 3150 US St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1981 –
OAS 3150 US Antigua and Barbuda 1981 –
OAS 3150 US St. Kitts and Nevis 1984 –
OAS 3150 US Mexico 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Belize 1991 –
OAS 3150 US Guatemala 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Honduras 1948 –
OAS 3150 US El Salvador 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Nicaragua 1948 –
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Table B.7: Asymmetric multilateral security guarantees, continued.
Name ATOP ID Patron Protégé Signed Ended
OAS 3150 US Costa Rica 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Argentina 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Bolivia 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Brazil 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Chile 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Colombia 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Ecuador 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Panama 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Paraguay 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Peru 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Uruguay 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Venezuela 1948 –
OAS 3150 US Jamaica 1969 –
OAS 3150 US Surinam 1977 –
OAS 3150 US Guyana 1991 –
NATO 3180 US Canada 1949 –
NATO 3180 US Britain 1949 –6
NATO 3180 US Netherlands 1949 –
NATO 3180 US Belgium 1949 –
NATO 3180 US Luxembourg 1949 –
NATO 3180 US France 1949 –7
NATO 3180 US Spain 1981 –
NATO 3180 US Portugal 1949 –
NATO 3180 US Germany 1990 –8
NATO 3180 US West Germany 1954 1990
NATO 3180 US Poland 1997 –
NATO 3180 US Hungary 1997 –
NATO 3180 US Czech Republic 1997 –
NATO 3180 US Slovak Republic 2003 –
NATO 3180 US Italy 1949 –
NATO 3180 US Albania 2008 –
NATO 3180 US Montenegro 2016 –
NATO 3180 US Croatia 2008 –
NATO 3180 US Slovenia 2003 –
NATO 3180 US Greece 1951 –
NATO 3180 US Bulgaria 2003 –
NATO 3180 US Romania 2003 –
NATO 3180 US Estonia 2003 –
NATO 3180 US Latvia 2003 –
NATO 3180 US Lithuania 2003 –
NATO 3180 US Norway 1949 –
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Table B.8: Asymmetric multilateral security guarantees, continued.
Name ATOP ID Patron Protégé Signed Ended
NATO 3180 US Denmark 1949 –
NATO 3180 US Iceland 1949 –
NATO 3180 US Turkey 1951 –
ANZUS 3215 US Australia 1951 –
ANZUS 3215 US New Zealand 1951 1986
SEATO 3260 US Australia 1954 1977
SEATO 3260 US France 1954 19779
SEATO 3260 US New Zealand 1954 1977
SEATO 3260 US Pakistan 1954 1972
SEATO 3260 US Philippines 1954 1977
SEATO 3260 US Thailand 1954 1977
Warsaw Pact 3285 USSR East Germany 1955 1990
Warsaw Pact 3285 USSR Poland 1955 1991
Warsaw Pact 3285 USSR Hungary 1955 1991
Warsaw Pact 3285 USSR Czechoslovakia 1955 1991
Warsaw Pact 3285 USSR Albania 1955 1968
Warsaw Pact 3285 USSR Bulgaria 1955 1991
Warsaw Pact 3285 USSR Romania 1955 1991
CSTO 4220 Russia Belarus 1994 –
CSTO 4220 Russia Armenia 1992 –
CSTO 4220 Russia Georgia 1993 1999
CSTO 4220 Russia Azerbaijan 1993 1999
CSTO 4220 Russia Tajikistan 1992 –
CSTO 4220 Russia Kyrgyzstan 1992 –
CSTO 4220 Russia Uzbekistan 1992 1999
CSTO 4220 Russia Uzbekistan 2006 2012
CSTO 4220 Russia Kazakhstan 1992 –
CIS 4400 Russia Belarus 1993 –
CIS 4400 Russia Armenia 1993 –
CIS 4400 Russia Georgia 1993 2009
CIS 4400 Russia Azerbaijan 1993 –
CIS 4400 Russia Tajikistan 1993 –
CIS 4400 Russia Kyrgyzstan 1993 –
CIS 4400 Russia Uzbekistan 1993 –
CIS 4400 Russia Kazakhstan 1993 –
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Table B.9: Additional asymmetric security guarantees, signed prior to patron nuclearization.
Bilateral ATOP ID Patron Protégé Signed Ended Active
Yes 2370 USSR Mongolia 1936 1966 1949-1966
Yes 2535 USSR UK 1941 1955 1949-195210
Yes 2563 USSR Czechoslovakia 1943 1970 1949-1960
Yes 2571 US Portugal 1944 1946 1945-1946
Yes 2575 USSR France 1944 1955 1949-1955
No 3010 US Cuba 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Haiti 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Dominican Republic 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Mexico 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Guatemala 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Honduras 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US El Salvador 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Nicaragua 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Costa Rica 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Panama 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Colombia 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Venezuela 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Ecuador 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Peru 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Brazil 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Bolivia 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Paraguay 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Chile 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Argentina 1945 1947 1945-1947
No 3010 US Uruguay 1945 1947 1945-1947
Yes 3020 USSR Yugoslavia 1945 1949 1949
Yes 3025 USSR Poland 1945 1965 1949-1965
Yes 3030 USSR China 1945 1950 1949-1950
Yes 3115 USSR Romania 1948 1970 1949-1970
Yes 3120 USSR Hungary 1948 1967 1949-1967
Yes 3135 USSR Bulgaria 1948 1967 1949-1967
Yes 3140 USSR Finland 1948 1992 1949-1992
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Table B.10: Nuclear proliferation and alliances, 1945–2012 from Lanoszka (2018).
Country Patron11 NW Years12 ENR Years13 NPT14
Algeria USSR 1983–2012 1992–2012 D: 1995
Argentina US 1968–90 1968–73; 83–89; 93–94 D: 1995
Australia US 1956–73 1972–83; 92–2007 S: 1970; D: 1973
Belgium US – 1966–74 S: 1968; D: 1975
Brazil US* 1953–90 1979–2012 D: 1998
Canada US – 1944–76; 90–93 S: 1968; D: 1969
China USSR 1955–2012 1960–2012 D:1992
Czechia Soviet/ US* – 1977–98 S: 1968; D: 1969
Egypt Soviet/ US* 1960–74 1982–2012 S: 1968; D: 1981
France US 1946–2012 1949–2012 D: 1992
W. Germany US – 1964–2012 S: 1969; D: 1975
India – 1954–2012 1964–73; 77–2012 –
Indonesia None/ US* 1965–67 – S: 1970; D: 1979
Iran US*/None 1976–2012 1974–79; 85–2012 S: 1968; D: 1970
Iraq USSR* 1976–95 1983–91 S: 1968 ;D: 1969
Israel US* 1949–2012 1963–2012 –
Italy US – 1966-90 S:1969; D: 1975
DPRK USSR/ China 1965–2012 1975–93; 2003-12 S: 1968; O: 2003
ROK US 1959–78 1979–82; 91–2012 S: 1968; D: 1975
Libya USSR* 1970–2003 1982–2003 S: 1968; D: 1975
Netherlands US – 1973–2012 S: 1968; D: 1975
Norway US – 1961–68 S: 1968; D: 1969
Pakistan US* 1972–2012 1973–2012 –
Romania USSR 1985–90 1985–89 S: 1968; D: 1970
South Africa US* 1969–91 1967–2012 D: 1991
Sweden – 1946–69 1954–72 S: 1968; D: 1970
Switzerland – 1946–70 – S: 1969; D: 1977
Syria USSR 2000-12 – S: 1968; D: 1969
Taiwan US/ US* 1967–77; 87–88 1976–78 S: 1968; D: 1970
UK US 1945–2012 1952–2012 S: 1968; R: 1969
Yugoslavia – 1954–65; 74–88 1954–78 S: 1968; D: 1970
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Table B.11: Foreign deployment of nuclear weapons, 1950–2000.






East Germany USSR 1958–1991













(West) Germany US 1955-2000
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Replication of Crescenzi et al. (2012)
Table C.1 provides the results of a replication of Crescenzi et al. (2012). Model 1 is the full
sample of all alliances in the period from 1816–2000. Models 2 through 4 temporally limit the
sample. Model 2 examines the period from 1816–1913, Model 3 examines the period from 1914–
1945, and Model 4 examines the period from 1946–2000. Models 5 and 6 limit the sample based
on the type of alliance, with Model 5 looking only at bilateral alliances and Model 6 looking only
at defense pacts.
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